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The Confrontation: 
 
Tyronne first encountered James when they accidentally bumped elbows in 
a crowded bar…  An hour after leaving the bar, Tyronne and a friend spotted 
James outside a local diner.  They approached James slowly, and Tyronne 
said:  “Why did you bump into me back there?”  James moved forward, shoved 
him with both hands, and said: “Get out of my face.” …Without hesitating, 
Tyronne then stepped forward and tried to shove James in the chest, but missed 
and hit him in the face.  James fell back slightly.  He then turned around, took 
a couple steps away from Tyronne, and appeared to reach for something in his 
pocket.  Tyronne quickly pursued James from behind and punched him in the 
side of the head.  James fell to the ground.  Tyronne’s friend stepped forward 
and kicked James…   
 
INTRODUCTION 
Racial bias may unconsciously alter the recollection of facts by judges and 
jurors during all facets of the legal decision-making process.  In delegating 
fact-finding and decision-making authority to judges and juries, the American 
legal system makes a supposedly elementary but unsupported psychological 
assumption—that these individuals can cognitively process, evaluate, and 
weigh the facts that were presented during trial.1 The accuracy of this 
assumption recently has been challenged by behavioral law and economics 
scholars, who have demonstrated that cognitive biases affect the way people 
process information.2 Yet perhaps an even more vulnerable part of this 
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1 See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal 
Decision Making., 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 551 (2004) (stating: “The prevailing trial design 
rests on the assumption that the complex and vast amount of testimony, presented over the 
course of days and weeks, can be encoded, retained, and retrieved from memory in an 
unaltered state.”). 
2 These scholars aim to create a psychologically accurate model of legal decision-
making.  See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).  See also Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post Ex 
Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
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psychological assumption is implicated by systematic biases in memory recall.  
Unlike most cognitive biases, which are assumed to be race-irrelevant, 
unconsciously biased memory failures by judges and jurors may propagate 
implicit racial biases through the legal process itself.  Despite this challenge to 
basic assumptions of legal decision-making, scholarship has not yet examined 
whether judicial fact-finders and decision-makers systematically 
“misremember” facts in racially biased ways.  Nor has it adequately addressed 
the link between implicit racial biases, the law’s quest for justice, and cultural 
responsibility.3
In the past two decades legal scholars have identified a variety of ways in 
which unconscious racial biases influence the legal process.4 One significant 
methodology has involved examining the specific harms caused by 
unconscious racism, such as the connection between unconscious racial bias 
and acts of employment discrimination.5 Another methodology has involved 
evaluating the unintentional biasing implications of legislation.6 As scientific 
research methods continue to improve their rigor, we continue to learn more 
about the implicit nature of racial biases and stereotypes and how they might 
harbor immunity in the legal system. 
 
Shifting gears momentarily, let us now return to The Confrontation, the 
story presented at the beginning of this Article (but please do not look back at 
the story just yet).  Here’s a brief memory quiz about what you read.  Do the 
following facts accurately describe a piece of The Confrontation story you 
read? (answer yes or no to each question) (1) Tyronne kicked James.  (2)  
James pushed Tyronne.   (3) Tyronne tried to push James in the chest, but 
missed and hit him in the face.  Does the quiz seem easy to you?  Well, it might 
(check your answers in the footnote below).7 But make the facts a bit more 
 
571 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227 (2003).  Some cognitive biases, such as the hindsight bias, operate in close 
connection with memory processes.  By separating behavioral law and economics 
discussions from my discussion of unconscious memory biases, I do not mean to imply that 
other cognitive biases do not involve memory.  To the contrary, many cognitive biases, 
such as hindsight bias, availability heuristic, and primacy/recency effects, operate 
inextricably with the human memory. 
3 But see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).  Lawrence initiated this 
discussion twenty years ago, but the cultural responsibility element of his famous article is 
often overshadowed by discussions of his scientific claims about unconscious racism. 
4 See Id.; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 
(1995); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005). 
5 See, e.g. Krieger, supra note __.    
6 See Kang, supra note __. 
7 Here are the quiz answers.  Question 1 is inaccurate.  Tyronne did not kick James.  
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complicated (like a real case), and you might not remember as well.8 And 
simply change Tyronne’s race from African American to Caucasian (and his 
name to William) and you might even remember some facts differently.  Not 
convinced?  Read on, or perhaps skip ahead to the empirical study I 
conducted,9 which illustrates that these memory-driven unconscious biases 
occur in a systematic fashion. 
 
The empirical study I conducted investigated whether unconscious racism 
affects how mock jurors remember legal facts.  I asked people to read the facts 
of legal stories (one is an expanded version of The Confrontation), briefly 
distracted their attention,10 and then quizzed their memories of the facts.  The 
actors’ race served as the independent variable—people read about either 
William (a Caucasian), Kawika, (a Hawaiian), or Tyronne (an African-
American).11 The results of the study demonstrate that the race of a civil 
plaintiff or a criminal defendant can unconsciously cause people to 
misremember a case’s facts in racially biased ways.  For example, people who 
read about Tyronne or Kawika were more likely to remember aggressive facts 
from the “confrontation” compared to people who read about William.12 The 
results also show that susceptibility to misremembering facts based on race 
cannot be attributed to more overtly racist people —those who were susceptible 
to racial misremembering were even sometimes less explicitly racist. 
 
This Article, including the empirical study I conducted on juror memories, 
brings together theories and methods from legal discourse on unconscious 
racism and from psychology studies of implicit social cognition and memory 
processes.  It is structured as follows:  Section II begins by offering 
psychological proof of unconscious racism.  It details recent studies in which 
people’s unconscious racial attitudes and stereotypes are measured in novel, yet 
methodically rigorous ways.   Then it turns to legal discourse on unconscious 
racism, and looks at how legal commentators have incorporated psychological 
 
Tyronne’s friend kicked James.  Questions 2 and 3 are accurate. 
8 Research has suggested that jurors may not remember much more than half of 
information presented at trial.  See Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan, Does Jury 
Deliberation Really Improve Jurors' Memories? 16 APP. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 589 
(2002)(finding a 60% accuracy rate of recall for mock jurors who watched a thirty-five 
minute video of a case).   
9 See infra Section IV. 
10 With The Confrontation, I attempted to create a similar effect for readers of this 
Article by pausing two paragraphs before asking the basic recall questions.  Almost all 
memory studies on recall provide a brief distraction task between presenting the task and 
testing recall.  See infra Section III for examples. 
11 For one case, participants read an expanded version of The Confrontation. In the 
other story they read about an employment termination scenario.  Names and races were 
similarly varied in the independent variable condition. 
12 For detailed results, see infra Section IV. 
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knowledge of these studies into critiques of legal theory, frequently by 
focusing on the gap between legal tests and psychological reality.  It highlights 
the connection between unconscious racism, social justice, and cultural 
responsibility that was present in early discussions on unconscious bias, but has 
seemingly faded as the scientific model has improved and legal discourse 
zooms in to follow.  Finally, it notes that little or no empirical work has been 
conducted to determine whether unconscious racial bias may affect judge and 
juror memories of case facts.   
 
Section III investigates the intricacies and errors of human memory 
processes and discusses the intimate connection between memory and legal 
decision-making.  It describes several systematic flaws in the human memory, 
including the generation of false memories.  Empirical studies indicate that 
people unconsciously create false memories in ways that are consistent with 
stereotypes.  Section III then turns to legally relevant examples of memory 
failure.  Thus far, discussions of failures of memory in the legal setting have 
typically been limited to faulty eyewitness identifications, such as when the 
“own race bias” manifests.  Based upon the research discussed in Sections II 
and III, I argue that unconscious bias likely affects legal decision-making by 
altering judge and jury memories of case facts.  Section IV details the empirical 
study I conducted, which tested whether manipulating the race of actors in a 
legal scenario would affect how accurately people recalled the story’s events.  
The study showed that for some facts, simply altering a legal actor’s race 
caused participants to remember certain facts or generate false memories in 
racially biased ways.   
 
Section V begins by discussing the relationship between implicit biases, 
culture, and the law.  It points out that implicit biases are not errors caused by 
scientific quirks, but are meaningful manifestations of social and cultural 
norms.  It then discusses how the law’s quest for justice requires that implicit 
racial biases not simply be addressed with a temporary debiasing framework, 
but with a reflective, culturally competent mandate.  Yet until a cultural 
solution emerges through time, learning, and change strategies, we are stuck 
with a system in which racial biases are transmitted implicitly through legal 
decision-making process.  Thus, the Section addresses a debiasing model that 
might help moderate implicit memory biases, though only temporarily.  While 
such models risk overlooking the cultural responsibility for implicit bias, they 
do hold some promise for minimizing harm.  These temporary solutions 
include (a) using debiasing techniques to block stereotypes and enhance 
memory, (b) striving for more counter-stereotypic legal professionals and more 
diverse juries, and (c) implementing more widespread procedural changes such 
as juror note-taking and question asking.  Section VI concludes. 
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II. UNCONSCIOUS RACISM EXPOSED: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROOF AND LEGAL 
DISCOURSE 
Over the past decade, studies have deconstructed the complicated ways in 
which the human mind maintains and manifests unconsciously biased racial 
attitudes and stereotypes.  Many of these studies have reached the same 
conclusion—that unconscious biases are real, pervasive, and difficult to 
change.13 Responding to the growing scientific proof of unconscious bias, 
legal commentators have called for various types of reform.14 Reform minded 
scholars have, for example, focused on the relationship between discriminatory 
acts triggered by unconscious bias (such as employment decisions) and the 
failure of legal rules to properly guard against or provide recourse for such 
acts.15 These works often critique a substantive legal rule or construct (such as 
the intent doctrine) in light of psychological evidence that indicates that such 
rule or construct fails to truly understand the implicit nature of racism.16 While 
such works have made great progress in discussing the relationship between 
substantive legal rules and unconscious racism, less progress has been made in 
studying how unconscious racism affects legal processes such as judicial 
rulings and jury decision-making.17 
In order to develop fully a theory on how unconscious racism might affect 
judicial rulings and jury decision-making, three distinct areas of scholarship on 
unconscious bias are helpful for review: (1) empirical psychological studies 
that document various forms of unconscious racism; (2) detailed legal 
arguments that call for reform of legal tests to match cognitive and racial 
realities; and (3) cognitive science studies that show the fragility of the human 
memory and connect memory failures to racial biases.  This Section tackles the 
first two of these areas, and Section III address the third.    
 
A.  Psychological Evidence of Unconscious Racism 
 
Unconscious racism materializes in a variety of different forms and can 
 
13 See, e.g., Anthony Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit 
Cognition:  The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 
(1998); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1321 (2002). 
14 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Krieger, supra note __. 
15 See Lawrence, supra note __.  Krieger, supra note __.   
16 See Lawrence, supra note __.  Krieger, supra note ___.   
17 Some authors, such as those examining peremptory challenges, focus on the 
intersection of substantive rules and legal processes.  See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-
Spot:  Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U.L. REV. 155 
(2005) (thoroughly outlining research on unconscious racism). 
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affect the legal process in many ways.  One possible, but troubling, way that 
unconscious racism may manifest in legal decision-making is through biased 
memories.  In this Article, I argue that unconscious racism automatically 
causes jurors (and perhaps even judges18) to misremember case facts in racially 
biased ways.  According to this argument and its underlying empirical 
prediction, implicit racial biases are triggered in jurors and manifest 
automatically through memory processes.  This racial bias will distort case 
facts in ways that are completely unknown to the juror but prejudicial to the 
legal actor (for example, a criminal defendant or a plaintiff in an employment 
discrimination claim).  Thus, the argument draws upon research in two related 
psychological areas, social cognition research and studies on human memory.19 
Social cognition studies on bias explore the vast role of often automatic 
cognitive processes in decision-making.  Memory studies, including those 
conducted using social cognition methodologies, reveal the vast powers of the 
human mind, but also the systematic failures of the human mind’s ability to 
recall certain facts.  In combination with memory theories that reveal 
systematic shortcomings of human recall, social cognition research can provide 
empirically solid ground for the prediction that unconscious racial attitudes and 
stereotypes are powerful and reliable enough to affect jury memories in biased 
ways. 
 
Implicit Social Cognition. Much of the existing evidence of unconscious 
racial bias comes from the field of social cognition.20 Social cognition research 
analyzes how people think about themselves and others, often using methods 
 
18 In this Article, I argue that both juries and judges will likely be affected by 
unconscious memory biases.  Some readers might prefer to see me address only jury 
decision-making in this context.  After all, the empirical study I conducted focuses more 
closely on mock jurors, not on judges.  Nonetheless, in light of evidence detailing 
systematic errors in a wide range of human cognitions, it is important not to leave judges 
out of the discussion.  Research on judicial versus jury decision-making biases appears to 
corroborate the decision to include judges as possible unconscious propagators of bias.  See 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for 
Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005) (indicating that judges and jurors may well 
suffer from the same errors of thought); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1251 (2005) (indicating that judges are not always able to disregard certain 
information, even when required by their own rulings); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias,
42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1994); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 777 (2001) (finding that judges, while sometimes less susceptible to biases than 
juries, still exhibit systematic cognitive biases).  For the sake of brevity and clarity, this 
Article will only occasionally repeat “and judges” throughout.  
19 Some research on memory falls under the umbrella of social cognition because of its 
focus on cognitive processes.  I review research in memory studies and errors, infra Section 
III.   
20 See, e.g,. Kang, supra note __. 
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from cognitive psychology to investigate how the human mind works.21 The 
area of social cognition thus includes work on a wide range of topics, including 
attribution theory, schemas, the self, reasoning processes and decision-making, 
memory, and attitudes.22 It should come as no surprise, then, that social 
cognition research also examines stereotypes, biases, and inter-group relations.  
In her groundbreaking work on unconscious bias and employment 
discrimination, Linda Hamilton Krieger provided three overarching themes of 
social cognition research on biases and stereotypes, each of which she related 
to bias in the workplace:  First, normal cognitive processes automatically 
trigger stereotyping;23 Second, stereotypes and biases operate absent an explicit 
intent to use them;24 and Third, “[p]eople’s access to their own cognitive 
processes is in fact poor.”25 Thus, studies in social cognition have illustrated 
that racial attitudes and stereotypes are both automatic and implicit.  That is, 
people possess attitudes and stereotypes of which they have little or no 
conscious control or awareness.   
 
A now famous example of social cognition research on unconscious racial 
bias comes from research by Mazharin Banaji, Anthony Greenwald and their 
colleagues, who began using the Implicit Association Test in the 1990s.26 The 
Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) pairs an attitude object (such as a racial 
group) with an evaluative dimension (good or bad) and tests how response 
accuracy and speed indicate unconscious and automatic attitudes and 
stereotypes.27 In the computerized version of the IAT, participants sit at a 
computer and keyboard and are asked to pair an attitude-object (e.g. Black or 
White; man or woman; fat or thin) with either an evaluative dimension (e.g. 
good or bad) or an attribute dimension (e.g. home or career; science or arts) as 
 
21 SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991). 
22 Id.
23 Krieger, supra note __ at 1188.  For more on the automaticity of stereotypes, see 
John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and 
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996); John A. 
Bargh et al., The Generality of the Automatic Attitude Activation Effect. 62 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 893 (1992). 
24 Id. at 1189. 
25 Id. Kang labels this as “dissociation”-- the gap between conscious awareness and 
implicit attitude.  See Kang, supra note __ at 1513.  See also Laurie A. Rudman, Social 
Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society:  The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of 
Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUSTICE RES. 129, 133 (2004) (similarly summarizing the 
automaticity, unintentionality and often unconscious nature of implicit biases). 
26 See Greenwald et al., supra note __; Anthony Greenwald & Mazharin Banaji, 
Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes. 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4
(1995) (discussing theories underlying implicit social cognition and the IAT). 
27 Mazharin Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF 
REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117 (Henry L. Roediger, III, et 
al., eds. 2001). 
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quickly as they can.28 The speed at which the participants can pair the words 
together (e.g. in one task, participants are told to quickly pair together pictures 
of African American faces with positive words from the evaluative dimension) 
is interpreted as the strength of the attitude (or in the case of attributes, the 
strength of the stereotype).29 As described by Nilanjani Dasgupta and 
Greenwald, “[w]hen highly associated targets and attributed targets share the 
same response key, participants tend to classify them quickly and easily, 
whereas when weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response 
key, participants tend to classify them more slowly and with greater 
difficulty.”30 As demonstrated by Greenwald and his colleagues’ in their 
landmark study (and in numerous follow-ups31), study participants consistently 
demonstrate implicit attitudes and stereotypes in areas including race, gender, 
and beyond.32 The time measurement variable used in the IAT allows 
researchers to determine that it is implicitly harder for people to group together, 
for example, images of Black faces with positive words than it is for them to 
group together Black faces and negative words.33 The systematic display of 
racial biases on the IAT has been confirmed by examining hundreds of 
thousands of IATs taken in recent years on the IAT project’s website.34 
Other than through the IAT, unconscious racism has been documented 
using a variety of methodologies.35 One series of studies uses custom made 
 
28 Banaji, supra note __ at 123. 
29 Id. See also Greenwald et al, supra note __. 
30 Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic 
Attitudes:  Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked 
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800 (2001). 
31 Recent research on the IAT is quite voluminous.  One often contested area of study 
on the IAT relates to the validity of the measurements.  See, e.g., Alan J. Lambert et al., On 
the Predictive Validity of Implicit Attitude Measures: The Moderating Effect of Perceived 
Group Variability, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 114 (2005); C. Miguel Brendl et 
al., How Do Indirect Measures of Evaluation Work?  Evaluating the Inference of Prejudice 
in the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 760 (2001). 
32 See, e.g., Greenwald et al, supra note __; Anthony G. Greenwald & S. D. Farnham, 
Using the Implicit Association Test to Measure Self-Esteem and Self-Concept. 79 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1022 (2000); D. Maison et al., The Implicit Association 
Test As a Measure of Implicit Consumer Attitude, 32 POLISH PSYCHOL. BULL., 1 (2001).  
Dozens of IAT tests are available at the Project Implicit Website, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/    (last visited Jul. 2006).  See also Brian Nosek et al., 
Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP 
DYNAMICS 101 (2002) (reporting results from hundreds of thousands of IATs on the 
popular on-line Website, including significant Black-White IAT results). 
33 See Greenwald et al., supra note __; Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note __; Nosek 
et al., supra note __.  
34 Nosek et al., supra note __.  
35 Jerry Kang, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Gary Blasi and others have described some of 
these studies.  See Kang, supra note __; Krieger, supra note __; Gary Blasi, Critical Race 
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video games to examine the race-based phenomenon of “shooter bias.”36 This 
bias emerges when participants play a video game that instructs them to shoot 
perpetrators (who are holding guns) as fast as they can but not to shoot 
innocent bystanders (who are unarmed).  The “shooter bias” refers to 
participants’ propensity to shoot Black perpetrators more quickly and more 
frequently than White perpetrators and to decide not to shoot White bystanders 
more quickly and frequently than Black bystanders.37 Studies have also shown 
that participants more quickly identify handguns as weapons after seeing a 
Black face, and more quickly identify other objects (such as tools) as non-
weapons after seeing a White face.38 In these studies, participants are entirely 
unaware that they have even seen a White or Black face. The quick flashing 
image registers in the unconscious, but participants are not consciously aware 
of the prime.39 The unconscious visual stimulus is enough to change accuracy 
and speed of identification of the gun or tool in a racially biased way.   
 
Faced with the results described above and the concern that “officers use 
 
Studies:  Advocacy Against the Stereotype:  Lessons from Cognitive Psychology 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1241 (2002).  See also Jerry Kang & Mazharin Banaji, A Behavioral-Realist 
Revision of ‘Affirmative Action,’ 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006). 
36 See Correll et al., supra note __ (2002); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: 
The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86 (2001); Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related 
Potentials and The Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive 
Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 120 (2006).   Several of the original studies 
on shooter bias were reviewed by Kang, supra note __. 
37 Correll et al, supra note __ (2002); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of 
Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 399 (2003).  Most discussions of shooter bias focus on race in explaining the 
Black-White result differences.  Another possibility in these studies is reflected by the 
concept of “colorism”.  See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown:  The Law of Skin Color, 49 
DUKE L.J. 1487 (1999). 
38 Correll et al, supra note __ (2006), citing D.M. Amodio et al, Neural Signals for the 
Detection of Unintentional Race Bias, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 88 (2004), C.M. Judd et al., 
Automatic Stereotypes Versus Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the 
Payne (2002) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75 (2004); Payne, 
supra note __  (2001; K. Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility 
Bias and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (2002). 
39 This visual flashing technique is known as “priming.” A well known example of a 
priming study is Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the 
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans. 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
797 (1995) (finding that priming racial identity affects standardized tests scores).  For a 
legal article on priming, see Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community 
Values in Juries:  How “Legal Priming” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1059 (2005) (arguing that placing citizens on juries alters their cultural and 
cognitive reference points and therefore changes their decision-making). 
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race when making the decision to shoot,”40 researchers have continued to 
investigate the roots of shooter bias.  Studies have linked shooter bias to 
culturally held racial stereotypes, which link Blacks to danger.41 This well-
known racial stereotype may even manifest in brain processes that moderate 
responses to fear.  In a recent study, Joshua Correll and his colleagues looked 
at fluctuations in participants’ brain activity (known as “event-related brain 
potentials”) while they played the shooter video game.42 According to Correll 
and his colleagues, measuring event-related brain potentials can demonstrate a 
distinction in brain response when people detect threats compared to when they 
have a desire to control their response.43 Correll and his colleagues found that 
as participants played the video game, racial bias manifested in their brains.  
That is, participants’ brain activity showed more threat related brain activity for 
Black actors than White actors (even for Blacks without guns), and more 
control response activity for White actors compared to Black actors.44 These 
brain responses then correlated with the participants’ performance—the more 
biased brain activity they displayed, the more shooter bias they exhibited.45 
Despite the concern raised by the study’s result, Correll and his colleagues 
maintained optimism that future research will lead towards further 
understanding and perhaps eventually lead to moderation of real world shooter 
bias. 
 
A third type of social cognition study revealing unconscious racism uses 
word completion tasks to show how people more quickly associate 
stereotypical words when stereotypes have been activated.  These studies 
demonstrate that people can more quickly complete word fragments, identify 
stereotypic words, and pronounce stereotypic words when stereotypes have 
been activated compared to when they have not been activated.46 For example, 
a study by Daniel Gilbert and J. Gregory Hixon presented participants with lists 
of partially completed words and asked them to complete as many as possible 
during a short time period.47 Some of the words presented were stereotypically 
associated with Asians, such as the word “polite” (written as POLI_E, so that 
other words, such as “police,” could be formed during the word completion 
 
40 Correll, supra note __ (2006) at 120. 
41 Correll, supra note _ (2002); Correll, supra note __ (2006). 
42 Correll, supra note ___ (2006). 
43 These brain responses are known as P200 and N200 components, among others.  Id.
at __. 
44 Correll, supra note __ (2006) at __. 
45 Id. at __. Interestingly, biased results in brain activity and shooter bias also 
correlated with individual participants’ personal and cultural stereotypes. 
46 Ziva Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come to Mind and When Do 
They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation 
and Application, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 522 (2003). 
47 Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and 
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 509 (1991). 
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task).48 As they completed the task, participants were either exposed to a 
Caucasian or Asian research assistant, whose only role was to hold up cards 
containing the word fragments.  The participation of this assistant was 
hypothesized to be significant enough to activate racial stereotypes and thus 
affect word completions.  The hypothesis was correct.  Participants who saw an 
Asian assistant completed more words in a stereotype-consistent manner than 
those who saw a Caucasian assistant.49 This study, and others like it, indicates 
that implicit stereotypes manifest quickly and harmfully in a variety of 
different ways, and that they seemingly do so automatically any time there is a 
cognitive opportunity. 
 
Moving beyond social cognition, other projects using broader social 
science methodologies have revealed similar racial gaps.  Marianne Bertrand 
and Sendhil Mullainathan created fictitious character names and resumes and 
studied how real world potential employers responded to “African-American 
sounding names” compared to “White sounding names.”50 Using the fictitious 
resumes, which also varied the experience of the imaginary applicant, the 
experimenters responded to real help wanted ads in Boston and Chicago.51 The 
results demonstrated that employers were more likely to call job applicants 
with White sounding names than African-American sounding names.  In fact, 
when accounting for the dual influence of racial name sound and prior job 
experience, the researchers found that a White name yielded as many callbacks 
as an additional eight years of experience.52 
Research in social cognition and related areas thus provides strong 
evidence that implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes are triggered by 
automatic cognitive processes in a variety of cognitive domains.  Based upon 
this compelling evidence, it would not at all be surprising if yet another 
cognitive domain—that of memory—is similarly infected with implicit racial 
bias.  In Section III, I examine research on the human memory.  Such research 
illustrates a close connection between memory errors and racial stereotypes.  In 
 
48 Id. at 510.  Other words included “short,” “shy,” “rice,” and “nip.”  These words had 
been obtained from a previous experiment in which people were asked to name their 
stereotypes of Asians. 
49 Id. at 511.  The experimenters also tested how cognitive busyness affected 
stereotype consistent word completion.  The results reported in the text are for the non-
busy participants.  When participants were distracted while performing their tasks, 
stereotypes were moderated in word completions.  However, when stereotypes were 
activated in combination with busyness, participants were even more likely to apply 
stereotypes. 
50 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 991 (2004). 
51 Id.
52 Id. at 994. 
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the memory domain, as well as in implicit social cognition more generally, the 
manifestations of implicit racial bias often conflict with a person’s explicit 
attitudes about race.  This conflict is illustrated by the gap between implicit 
attitudes and explicit preferences.  
 
Explicit Racial Preference, Implicit Bias and Social Dominance. One 
particularly interesting characteristic of implicitly biased attitudes is that they 
frequently diverge from explicit racial preferences.  That is, overtly racist 
people are not the same people who are implicitly biased.53 According to 
Patricia Devine, “[e]ven those who consciously renounce prejudice have been 
shown to have implicit or automatic biases that conflict with their 
nonprejudiced values….”54 For example, Correll and his colleagues evaluated 
“shooter” video game participants on game performance (an implicit measure) 
and also asked them about their racial preferences (an explicit measure).55 
Results showed that explicit measures of racial preferences were not correlated 
with results for the video game.56 That is, people who exhibited greater 
amounts of “shooter bias” were not the same ones who endorsed more racially 
unequal preferences.  A related and somewhat surprising finding is that implicit 
bias sometimes occurs by members of the bias affected group.  For example, 
Banaji and Greenwald found that women and men both display implicit gender 
stereotypes that are sometimes negative towards women.57 
The relationship, if any, between implicit and explicit racial attitudes is 
relevant to legal discussions of bias.  If implicitly biased people are also 
systematically explicitly biased, one could argue that the law’s current 
protective focus on explicit and intentional discrimination might be sufficient.  
The law could wait for explicitly discriminatory actions and provide sufficient 
remedies.  But if implicitly biased citizens are not always more explicitly 
biased, then the law’s current focus on overtly racist acts overlooks a large 
percentage of racially biased action.  Thus, legal remedies focusing on explicit 
actions (those that could be tied to discriminatory motive, for example) fail to 
corral many cases of implicitly biased racial harms.58 The legal decision-
 
53 Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping:  How Automatic Are They?  
Introduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757 (2001). 
54 Id. But see Wilhelm Hofmann et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Correlation Between 
the Implicit Association Test and Explicit Self-Report Measures, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1369 (2005)(finding a general relationship between implicit and explicit 
attitudes). 
55 Kang, supra note __ at 1526, citing Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's 
Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1321 (2002). 
56 Id.
57Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in 
Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1995). 
58 See generally Lawrence, supra note __;  Krieger, supra note __. 
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making concerns are similar.  If unconscious discrimination manifests through 
the racially biased memories of judges and jurors, it would be important to 
know whether people with stronger explicit racially hierarchical preferences 
are more susceptible to its influences.  If not, our legal process could be 
propagating implicit racism with no safeguards in place. 
 
One reliable predictor of explicit racial bias is the Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) scale.  SDO is a measure that is designed to show an 
individual’s preference for social hierarchy.59 According to Felicia Pratto and 
her colleagues, a social dominance orientation is “the extent to which one 
desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups.”60 The 
scale that developed to test SDO has been accepted as a measure of explicit 
racism and has often been used by social psychologists to predict anti-Black 
racism as well as other explicit racial preferences.61 In the empirical study I 
conducted on memory bias and race, infra Section IV, I employed the SDO 
scale.  I conducted this test in order to determine whether implicit memory 
biases, if they do in fact exist, are related to explicit racial preferences.62 If the 
two are related, such that implicitly racist jurors are also explicitly racist, 
potential legal solutions might include employing explicit racism 
questionnaires for jurors.  Such screenings would thus block both explicitly 
racist and implicitly racist jurors from participating in biased decision-making.  
However, if implicit memory bias and explicit racial preferences are not 
related, then dealing with such biases becomes significantly harder. 
 
B.  Connecting Unconscious Biases and Legal Theory 
 
Most legal discussions of unconscious bias focus on the disharmony 
between legal tests for discrimination (which require explicit, intentional 
racism63) and the psychological reality of discrimination (which is often 
unconscious, implicit, and does not meet traditional definitions of intent).64 
These projects meaningfully incorporate empirical research on unconscious 
racism research into substantive legal models, and teach us that legal standards 
 
59 Felicia Pratto et al., Social Dominance Orientation:  A Personality Variable 
Predicting Social and Political Attitudes, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 741 (1994). 
60 Id. at __.  
61 To confirm validity, Pratto and her colleagues simultaneously tested their SDO 
measure along with several racism measures. Id. Results indicated that the SDO measured 
racism well. For each of these measures, there were significant correlations, indicating that 
the SDO agrees with these other scales.  To see the 14-item SDO dependent variables, see 
infra note __ and accompanying text. 
62 See infra note __ and accompanying text. 
63 See Lawrence, supra note __ (describing equal protection’s intent doctrine); 
Krieger, supra note __ (describing Title VII’s intent requirement).   
64 See Krieger, supra note __ (critiquing the continuing between disparate treatment 
and new knowledge on unconscious racism). 
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must evolve towards understanding the true workings of racial bias.  This 
lesson is powerful.  But there are other lessons we must learn from the new 
research on unconscious bias.  Most projects to date focus on the role of 
unconscious bias in the discriminatory act or mental state of the perpetrator of 
discrimination.  They have not focused on the decision-making implications of 
this new research.  Specifically, few projects investigate how racial biases 
unconsciously affect judges and juries.65 Nonetheless, the concept of 
unconscious racism is well established in legal scholarship.    
 
In what is credited as the most influential legal article on unconscious 
racism, Charles Lawrence challenged equal protection discourse with a 
psychological theory of unconscious discrimination.66 “[W]e are all racists,” 
he proclaimed, and noted that “most of us are unaware of our racism.”67 
Drawing upon research in both Freudian analysis and cognitive psychology, 
Lawrence questioned how the Washington v. Davis68 discriminatory purpose 
doctrine reflected an American culture that consistently propagates 
discrimination, most of which is unconscious.  The intent doctrine, Lawrence 
argued, not only misses the mark because of the scientific reality of 
unconscious racism, but in doing so fails to carry out the historical call for 
justice central to the Equal Protection Clause.69 Now, almost 20 years after 
Lawrence’s article was published, a heavily empirically focused field of 
psychology supports Lawrence’s contentions more than ever, highlighted by 
implicit social cognition findings.  Even the current field of cultural 
psychology, developed in the past two decades and a mere embryo in 1987, 
was born from an idea similar to Lawrence’s discussion of culture-- that 
cultural knowledge constantly shapes they way societal members think, feel, 
and perceive reality.70 This new scientific field has begun to help deconstruct 
 
65 Scholarship in the area of race and juries for the most part focuses either on the 
ultimate decision of the jury, or on areas like eyewitness identification.  These projects 
often overlook the powerful workings of unconscious bias in the various stages of legal 
decision-making.  For a discussion of some of the existing work on race and eyewitness 
identification, see infra note __ and accompanying text.  
66 Lawrence, supra note __. 
67 Lawrence, supra note __ at 322. 
68 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
69 Lawrence, supra note __ at __. 
70 See Richard A. Shweder, Cultural Psychology - What Is It, in CULTURAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (James W. Stigler et al. eds., 1990); Joan G. Miller, Culture and the 
Development of Everyday Social Explanation, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 
(1984). See also Michael Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and 
Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
949 (1994); See Li-Jun Ji et al, Culture, Change, and Prediction, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 450 
(2001); RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND 
WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY…AND WHY (2003).  The role of cultural norms in 
stereotype formation was also discussed by Eric Yamamoto. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO,
INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 
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cognitive biases (by illustrating their cultural limitations71) and lends support to 
Lawrence’s theory that the cultural foundations of unconscious racial 
discrimination must be investigated and understood.72 
Outside of equal protection discourse, a major area of focus on unconscious 
racism has been in the employment discrimination arena, where scholars have 
debated not only whether unconscious racism actually affects employment 
decisions, but also how employment law doctrine should change (or not 
change) to incorporate a better understanding of how racism truly works.  In an 
early major project in this area, Linda Hamilton Krieger discussed subtle forms 
of racism in Title VII employment discrimination cases, arguing that disparate 
treatment jurisprudence incorrectly assumes motivational, rather than 
cognitive, bases for discrimination.73 Stating that though employment 
discrimination law’s assumptions about the nature of discrimination may have 
been accepted historically by scientists, “these assumptions have been so 
undermined, both empirically and theoretically, that they can no longer be 
considered valid.”74 To illustrate the gap between the law’s focus on conscious 
motivation and empirical evidence revealing unconscious racism, Krieger 
reviewed social cognition studies beginning in the 1960’s, starting with 
research demonstrating the automatic nature of ingroup and outgroup 
categorization.  For example, Krieger described a 1973 study by Billig and 
Tajfel that indicated that people chose to allocate monetary rewards to ingroup 
members rather than outgroup members, even when greater fairness and mutual 
 
(1999).  For legal articles discussing the intersection of cultural psychology and law, see 
Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided:  How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore 
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 HOW. L. J. 601 
(2005)(arguing for culturally competent legal rules); Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, 
Different Torts for Different Cohorts:  A Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort Law’s 
Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 SO. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195 
(2004)(highlighting cultural differences cognitive biases, causation and foreseeability in the 
U.S. and China); Justin Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Valuing Cultural Differences in 
Behavioral Economics, available at SSRN (unpublished manuscript, May 2006) (arguing 
for a cultural model of behavioral economics). 
71 See Levinson & Peng, supra note __. 
72 See infra Section V for a more detailed discussion of the cultural influences of 
thought and decision-making. 
73 Krieger, supra note __ at 1186-1211.  See also Deana Pollard, Unconscious Bias 
and Self-Critical Analysis:  The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment 
Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999) (arguing for a qualified evidentiary 
privilege to encourage unconscious-bias testing); Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for 
Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK L. REV. 1299 (1995) (sounding another early call 
for incorporating unconscious discrimination into intentional discrimination standards); 
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129 (1999)(discussing 
“unconscious disparate treatment”). 
74 Krieger, supra note __ at 1165. 
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gain would have been achieved using other allocations.75 Bridging empirical 
findings and anti-discrimination policy, Krieger suggested reformulating 
disparate treatment doctrine to allow proof that group status played a role in 
causing an employment decision.  This change would alter courts’ focus from 
an intentionality standard-- whether an employer intended that race make a 
difference in an employment decision, to a causation standard-- whether race or 
group status made a difference in the decision.76 
Since Krieger’s groundbreaking work, employment law scholarship has 
blossomed with discussions of unconscious racism.77 Ann McGinley claimed 
that the Title VII’s proof constructs did historically and should now include 
evidence of unequal treatment caused by unconscious discrimination, but that 
courts have been unjustifiably tightening their analysis in ways that exclude 
such evidence.78 Lu-In Wang carried forward Krieger’s focus on unconscious 
racism, arguing that institutions are partly to blame for perpetuating a status 
quo fraught with racial bias.79 Tristin Green argued that corporate culture itself 
propagates racism in an unconscious way.80 Melissa Hart focused on how 
existing Title VII remedies may actually provide redress for unconscious 
racism manifested in employment decisions.81 Angela Onwuachi-Willig and 
Mario Barnes critiqued Title VII in light of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s 
study,82 arguing that constructed social meanings of race (such as someone 
being “regarded as” Black), rather than race itself, should be used in legal 
 
75 Id. at 1192-1193 (citing Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and 
Similarity in Intergroup Behavior, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (1973)). 
76 Id. at 1242. 
77 See, e.g. Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2005). 
78 Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title 
VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 419 (2000). 
79 Lu-In Wang, Race as Proxy:  Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013 (2004). 
80 Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623 (2005).  
81 Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala. 
L. Rev. 741, 745-49 (2005). 
82 Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note __.  An article that predates and contextualizes 
Bertrand & Mullainathan as well as others’ research in the field is Mari J. Matsuda, Voices 
of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last 
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991)(stating “[s]omeone who tells you they don't 
like the way you speak is quite likely telling you that they don't like you”).  Matsuda 
addressed the role of prejudice relating to the way racial minorities speak and casts the 
importance of voice and accent in (and beyond) a Title VII framework.  While Bertrand 
and Mullainathan did not test the role of voice and accent in hiring decisions, one might 
anticipate that such a study would be worth conducting.  For a recent article on the 
changing form of discrimination, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race 
Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006). 
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applications of anti-discrimination laws.83 Samuel Bagenstos described the 
compelling nature of unconscious racism literature and used it to evaluate a 
“structural approach” to antidiscrimination law, which he claimed highlights 
both the hope and also the challenges of discrimination.84 
Legal scholarship on unconscious bias has not been limited to equal 
protection and employment discrimination discussions.  In other areas of law, 
the prevalence of scholarship discussing unconscious racism has increased 
greatly.85 Critiquing the FCC’s call for more local news by virtue of the 2003 
Media Ownership Order and related “public interest” obligation, Jerry Kang 
relied on social cognition research in claiming that local news broadcasts can 
act as a “trojan horse,” a covert delivery mechanism that propagates the 
implicit tools of racism.86 Kang systematically described social cognition 
studies that indicate that the simple presence of racial cues can trigger 
unconscious racial bias.  For example, Kang reviewed research on the IAT, 
detailed studies on shooter bias, and discussed a variety of other studies.87 He 
then demonstrated how these accounts of unconscious racial bias are not 
harmless attitudes with little or no connection to real world effects.  Instead, 
they can be directly linked to racially biased behavior, interactions and 
outcomes, as confirmed by the racial discrepancies found in Bertrand and 
Mullainathan’s study of racially stereotyped names and job interview requests, 
among others.88 Furthermore, echoing Krieger’s prior message, Kang’s 
account provided compelling evidence that people frequently have no 
conscious awareness of their own implicit biases.89 
Kang recently joined with Banaji to argue for a “fair measures” model of 
affirmative action that incorporates knowledge from implicit social cognition.90 
Advancing a new methodology called “behavioral legal realism,”91 Kang and 
 
83 Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name? On “Being 
Regarded” as Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White,
2005 WISC. L. REV. 1283 (noting that employers often use other criteria as proxies for race, 
national origin, sex, religion, or age).  
84 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
85 See, e.g. Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit Association Test": A Measure of 
Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 413-15 
(2003); Andrew Elliot Carpenter, student article: Chambers v. Mississippi: The Hearsay 
Rule and Racial Evaluations of Credibility, 8 WASH. & LEE R.E.A.L. J. 15 (2002)(arguing 
that unconscious racial bias affects judicial determinations of witness creditability). 
86 Kang, supra note __ at 1508. 
87 Id. at 1525. 
88 Id. at  1515.  See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note __. 
89 Kang, supra note __ at 1508. 
90 Kang & Banaji, supra note __. 
91 This model seeks to expose and then remedy gaps between legal assumptions and 
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Banaji addressed the unpersuasive nature of traditional debates over affirmative 
action, pointing out that implicit social cognition research opens new avenues 
for affirmative action discourse.92 Demonstrating the many ways that implicit 
racial bias functions automatically and contrary to explicit preferences, they 
proposed a system of “fair measures” that harnesses science as part of policy 
development.  Taking “fair measures” in response to societal implicit biases 
requires counteracting or avoiding (if and when possible) the harmful effects of 
implicit bias.  For example, Kang and Banaji argue that “cloaking” social 
category93 or removing stereotype threat triggers94 can help avoid known areas 
of harm connected to bias.95 Kang and Banaji also use evidence of successful 
bias reduction strategies to call for a new type of fair measure—using 
“debiasing agents”.96 This fair measure harnesses bias reduction studies 
indicating that minority role models and authority figures have the unique 
ability to temporarily reduce (or at least suppress) implicit bias.  In practical 
terms, using a “debiasing agent” might include publicizing or hiring counter 
stereotypical exemplars—such as women construction workers, male nurses, 
Black intellectuals, and White janitors.97 If people recognize and associate 
these debiasing agents as “anchored to that social category,” related biases and 
stereotypes may become moderated over time.98 
Another example of the growing scholarship on unconscious racism is 
Antony Page’s critique of the Batson v. Kentucky three-step procedure for 
attacking peremptory challenges.99 Presenting a broad array of evidence 
detailing the automaticity of racial and gender stereotyping, Page challenged 
the Batson test in light of social science research.100 Supporting Krieger and 
 
scientific reality.  Id. at [2].  Work by Lawrence, Kreiger, and others focusing on 
unconscious motives fits nicely within this “behavioral realist model.”  See also Levinson, 
supra note __ (“Mentally Misguided”) (empirically evaluating the gap between legal 
standards of “intent” and psychology reality of the way people perceive intentionality). 
92 Id. at [7]. 
93 Blind grading is an example of a cloak already employed in many law schools.  Id.
at [25].  The authors point out that such a step could help ameliorate effects such as those 
demonstrated by Bertrand and Mullainathan’s job resume study.  Id. at [25-26]. 
94 Stereotype threat describes the harmful effects that can be generated simply by 
“priming” racial or other stereotype consistent constructs.  For example, having African 
American students identify their race before taking a standardized test has been shown to 
lower their standardized test scores.  See Steele & Aronson, supra note __.   Avoiding 
racial primes in such situations may not fully counteract the effect of stereotypes on test 
performance, but it certainly can reduce it.  See Kang & Banaji, supra note __ at [28]. 
95 Kang & Banaji, supra note __ at [25-32]. 
96 Kang and Banaji use a “fair measures” model instead of an “affirmative action” 
model.  See Id. at [4] (explaining the new terminology). 
97 Id. at [39]. 
98 Id.
99 Page, supra note __. 
100 Page also highlighted the faultiness of human memories when information is 
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Kang’s work that pointed out the disconnect between conscious awareness and 
implicit bias, Page argued that because attorneys are not aware of their own 
thought processes, they may not themselves even know fully why they 
exercised a peremptory challenge.101 
Focusing on practical solutions to the unconscious racism problem, Jody 
Armour discussed unconscious racism by distinguishing between stereotypes 
and personal beliefs, and proposed using egalitarian (conscious) personal 
beliefs to help overcome the effects of unconscious racism on juries.102 
Armour argued that the best bias-combating strategies are not ex-post 
constitutional law inquiries (as called for by the intent doctrine), but a practical 
and scientifically grounded bias reduction strategy targeting legal decision-
makers.103 Despite Armour’s early call for bias reduction and for future 
research on overcoming bias, social cognition research in the past decade has 
not yet provided a universal bias reduction solution.  In fact, overcoming 
implicit biases such as those demonstrated by the IAT appears to be quite 
difficult, and is particularly resistant to conscious efforts.104 Through the years, 
however, scholars have kept Armour’s focus on overcoming bias alive.  In one 
such recent project, Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein suggested that perhaps 
legal rules themselves can offer clues to dealing with biases in the legal 
setting.105 
Scholars have also incorporated knowledge of implicit racial bias into 
political lawyering and social justice strategies.  Calling for practical 
applications of research on implicit bias, Gary Blasi argued that scientific 
research on the human mind and racial bias should be understood and applied 
by practicing attorneys and public policy advocates.106 As Blasi pointed out, 
 
inconsistent with stereotypes, and pointed out that people can also have “‘memory 
illusions’, in which [people] recall stereotype-confirming behaviors that never actually 
transpired.  Page, supra note __ at 220-221, citing Tadesse Araya et al., Remembering 
Things That Never Occurred:  The Effects of To-Be-Forgotten Stereotypical Information,
50 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 27 (2003).   
101 Page, supra note __ at 160. 
102 Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:  Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the 
Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733 (1995).  Jerry Kang notes that Armour’s distinction 
is roughly analogous to the difference between implicit versus explicit.  See Kang, supra 
note __ at 1508, note 81. 
103 Id.
104 See Jerry Kang, supra note __ at 1562 (noting that while conscious control may not 
counteract implicit attitudes demonstrated by the IAT, consciously altering “informational 
and interaction” environment might help).  Kang notes that implicit biases can be fought 
with implicit methods.  See Section V infra for a more detailed discussion of bias reduction 
strategies. 
105 Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006). 
106 Blasi, supra note __ at 1245. 
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understanding the true unconscious nature of bias can reshape the nature of 
effective advocacy.  Eric Yamamoto also recognized the importance of 
understanding unconscious racial forces in a public policy advocacy setting.107 
Examining the gap between legal efforts for social justice and scholarly 
pursuits in critical race theory, Yamamoto argued that political lawyering must 
become compatible with current perspectives on racism and bias, including the 
complex role of unconscious racism in society.108 
Perhaps reflecting successes of the sort advocated by Blasi and Yamamoto, 
recent judicial decisions have begun to recognize the influence of unconscious 
racial discrimination.109 In Chin v. Runnels, a criminal defendant convicted of 
murder appealed the guilty verdict on habeus corpus grounds, arguing that 
Chinese-American, Filipino-American and Hispanic-Americans had been 
excluded from service as foreperson on the grand jury that indicted him.  
Though the court denied the appeal in light of the “narrow standard of review 
available,”110 Judge Breyer nonetheless discussed the evidence regarding 
foreperson selection, which led to a “strong inference that the selection process 
may not have been race-neutral.”111 In the San Francisco court’s jurisdiction, 
no Chinese-American, Filipino-American, or Latinos had been chosen to be 
grand jury foreperson during a thirty-six year period, a result that would have 
amounted to a .0003% chance if evaluated based on the chances of random 
selection.112 Breyer wrote:  “the complete absence of grand jury forepersons of 
Chinese, Filipino, or Latino descent over a 36-year period begs the question 
whether unconscious stereotyping or biases may have contributed to the 
exclusion of these groups notwithstanding the best of intentions of those 
 
107 Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering 
Practice in Post Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) (recognizing the 
continued power of Lawrence’s arguments and drawing on the cultural links to 
discrimination). 
108 Id at 830. 
109 Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp.2d 891 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  Two recent projects discuss 
this case.  See Darren Seiji Teshima, A "Hardy Handshake Sort of Guy": The Model 
Minority and Implicit Bias About Asian Americans in Chin v. Runnels, 11 UCLA ASIAN 
PAC. AM. L.J. 122 (2006) (arguing that “court officials unconsciously relied on the 
stereotype of Asian Americans as unassertive and passive”); Sara R. Benson, Reviving the 
Disparate Impact Doctrine to Combat Unconscious Discrimination:  A Study of Chin v. 
Runnels, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43 (2005) (predicting that evidence of severe disparate 
impact plus unconscious bias will be enough will be enough for a plaintiff’s victory).  A 
more famous instance of unconscious discrimination being mentioned in the courts 
occurred in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Georgia v. McCollum. Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is by now clear that conscious and 
unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the 
facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence."). 
110 Id. at 39. 
111 Id. at 40. 
112 Id.
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involved.”113 Other prominent juridical references to unconscious racism have 
included references at the Circuit Courts114 and the Supreme Court.115 
As legal scholarship on unconscious bias has grown, empirical studies have 
consistently improved their methodology and continue to reveal a complex web 
of implicitly racist attitudes and stereotypes.116 Nonetheless, legal scholars and 
psychologists have generally overlooked how implicit racism explicitly effects 
legal decision-making processes.117 This hole in legal discourse continues to 
heighten the need for studies that connect unconscious racism with the legal 
decision-making processes. 
 
III. MISREMEMBERING LEGAL FACTS IN RACIALLY STEREOTYPED WAYS 
It should come as no surprise that the human mind does not always act like 
a sponge.  In the legal setting, we hope but hardly expect that jurors exhibit 
perfect retention of trial facts, particularly in complicated trials.118 Many 
recent discussions of cognitive bias, for example, detail biases that are 
intimately connected with judge and juror memory.119 Nonetheless, despite our 
 
113 Id. at 41. 
114 Id. at 42-43, citing EEOC v. Inland Marine, 729 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 855 (1984); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992); Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F. 
2d 928 (7th Cir. 1993). 
115 Id. at 43, citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)(O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
116 The evolution and debate over the IAT’s validity exemplifies the methodological 
challenges that must be overcome in order to have “good science.”  These challenges 
increase the quality of subsequent projects.   
117 Most studies on race in the law have focused on how race affects guilty verdicts.  
These studies are focused more on the outcome than on the process.  One potential way to 
overcome this gap in research is through cross-disciplinary collaborations. For a few 
examples of recent cross-disciplinary collaborations, see, e.g. Kang & Banaji, supra note 
__; Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:  Implications for 
Legal Advocacy and Social Justice (forthcoming CAL. L. REV. 2006).  A few collaborations 
have tested psychological phenomena in legal scenarios.  See Levinson & Peng, supra note 
__ (2006). 
118 See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 389 (1972) (J. Douglas dissenting, 
recognizing that juror memory of trial facts is “imperfect”); M. Neil Brown et al., The 
Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and Market System, 50 ST. LOUIS L. J. 425, 460 
(2006) (questioning juror memories when scientific studies indicate that people can only 
store 1% of information as long term memory).  For a psychological study assessing juror 
memory retention generally, see Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan, Memory 
Monitoring in Mock Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 152 
(1999)(demonstrating no correlation between mock jurors predictions and confidence in 
memory and actual memory performance). 
119 The hindsight bias and availability heuristic are two examples.  For discussions on 
these topics, see, e.g. Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note __.; Rachlinski, supra note __; 
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understanding that jurors’ memory capacities are limited and that cognitive 
biases persist, we still assume that these cognitive limitations are not embedded 
with racial bias.  As we have seen, however, social cognition research on 
implicit bias has taught us that people experience difficulty in performing a 
variety of simple cognitive tasks when basic racial constructs are active.120 It 
should not be surprising, then, if we learned that when participating in cases 
with racially diverse legal parties, jurors (and perhaps judges) unknowingly 
misremember trial information in systematically biased ways. 
 
This section explores research in human memory processes and presents 
theoretical background for my claim that legal decision-making processes are 
hindered by unconscious racial bias in memory retention of case facts.  To 
provide an overview of the relevant topics in memory, it explores a variety of 
empirical studies on the human memory.  These studies include examinations 
of false memory generation, the interaction between false memories and 
stereotypes, and memory errors known as “source monitoring error.”  The 
discussion then turns from proof of individual memory errors to address 
whether individual errors will affect group decision-making processes.  Taken 
together, research in memory and decision-making indicates that memory 
errors are normal, occur in stereotype driven ways, and can manifest in a 
variety of ways that can ultimately affect legal decision-making.   
 
A.  Memory Errors Are Normal and Meaningful 
 
Until the 1990’s, memory errors were frequently considered “noise” by 
social scientists.121 As a result, experimenters usually overlooked whether 
memory failures and false memories occurred systematically or whether they 
provided clues as to links between false memories and stereotypes.  In recent 
years, however, scholars of memory and cognitions have learned a great deal 
about the ways in which the human brain can systematically misremember 
 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years 
Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 715 (2003). Philip G. Peters, Jr., 
Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1277 (1999); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business 
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994); April M. 
Perry, Comment:  Guilt by Saturation:  Media Liability for Third-Party Violence and the 
Availability Heuristic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1045 (2003).   
120 See Banaji & Greenwald, supra note ___.  
121 Alison P. Lenton et al., Illusions of Gender:  Stereotypes Evoke False Memories, 37 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (2001).  Not all early work disregarded the social 
context of remembering.  Bartlett believed that “remembering is an active process that is 
guided and shaped by people’s knowledge and beliefs about the world.” C. Neil Macrae et 
al., Creating Memory Illusions:  Expectancy-Based Processing and the Generation of 
False Memories, 10 MEMORY 63 (2002), citing FREDERIC C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A
STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1932). 
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facts.122 According to Daniel Schacter, memory errors can be grouped into two 
broad categories:  forgotten information and distorted recollections.123 Errors 
based upon forgotten information and distorted recollections both have the 
potential to influence the way juries recall and “mis-recall” the facts of cases.  
Yet, few memory errors have been investigated in the context of jury decision-
making.124 Nonetheless, research on human memory processes has prospered 
outside of the law.  These studies have revealed two major themes: (1) people 
are generally unaware of how their memories work;125 and (2) 
misremembrances are not random-- they are normal, predictable and 
meaningful.126 The first theme perhaps illustrates why legal scholars have 
underutilized memory research in decision-making discussions (though studies 
on eyewitness identification have incorporated it in detail127).  The second 
theme and its implications illustrates why legal scholars should pay more 
attention to memory research. 
 
Misremembrances occur outside of our conscious awareness.  According to 
C. Neil Macrae and his colleagues, people are “unwittingly duped into 
believing that the contents of consciousness comprise an accurate record of the 
experienced past, when in fact they do not.  Instead, these items are false 
memories, illusory experiences of events, actions, and utterances that never 
occurred.”128 But why do false memories arise and what can we learn from 
them?  Memory researchers have found that false memories emerge regularly 
in the course of a normally cognitive functioning and that they are explainable 
by understanding the intricacies of the human mind.129 Some memory 
researchers have posited that people unknowingly reconstruct the past in ways 
that flatter their egos and serve to bolster their theories and beliefs about 
themselves.130 Others, however, have documented that false memories emerge 
 
122 See MEMORY DISTORTION: HOW MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT 
THE PAST (Daniel Schacter, ed. 1995). 
123 Schacter calls these error categories the “sin of omission” and the “sin of 
commission,” respectively.  DANIEL SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE 
MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS (2001). 
124 But see Jeanine Skorinko et al., Stereotypic Crimes: How Group-Crime 
Associations Affect Memory and (Sometimes) Verdicts and Sentencing (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author, June 2006).  This study is discussed infra note __ and 
accompanying text. 
125 CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THEORY,
RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 228 (3rd ed. 2004). 
126 Macrae et al., supra note __.  
127 These studies are often lead by psychologists rather than lawyers.  See infra note __ 
and accompanying text. 
128 Macrae et al., supra note __ at 63. 
129 Macrae et al., supra note __.   
130 Macrae et al., supra note __ at 64, citing Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian 
Ego:  Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 603 (1980); L. 
S. Newman & R.F. Baumeiser, Toward an Explanation of the UFO Abduction 
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in a broader range of situations.131 An investigation of these normal errors 
reveals that they frequently occur because of the human mind’s  heavy reliance 
on stereotypes.  
 
B.  Stereotypes Drive Recall Errors and False Memory Generation 
 
Both types of memory errors, those based on recall (forgetting) and those 
based on distorted recollections (false memories) tend to emerge in situations 
where stereotypes are involved.132 With respect to recall, memory stereotypes 
facilitate ease of access of information.  Thus, when people recall information, 
they sometimes do so based on familiarity.  But familiarity is code for 
stereotype.  Thus, people often recall stereotype-consistent information more 
easily than stereotype-inconsistent information.133 The link between 
 
Phenomenon:  Hypnotic Elaboration, Extraterrestrial Sadomasochism, and Spurious 
Memories, 7 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 99 (1996); and M. Ross, Relation of Implicit 
Theories to the Construction of Personal Histories, 96 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 341 (1989). 
131 See H. L. Roediger & K.B. McDermott, False Alarms About False Memories. 106 
PSYCHOL. REV. 406 (1999); H. L. Roediger & K.B. McDermott, Creating False Memories: 
Remembering Words That Were Not Presented in Lists, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 803 (1995). 
132 Stereotypes, by their nature, are not always bad.  In fact, they serve important 
cognitive functions.  See Page, supra note __ at 236.  Nonetheless, the stereotypes I discuss 
in this section are harmful stereotypes that relate race to undesirable characteristics. 
133 I have oversimplified things.  Stereotype consistent information is not always 
recalled more easily.  When people perceive events, if the information they perceive 
deviates sufficiently from their expectations, they may actually recall it better than 
stereotype-consistent information.  Thus, while people easily recall stereotype consistent 
information, sometimes they can more accurately recall stereotype-inconsistent 
information.  This seeming inconsistency should not be too troubling.  Here’s an example: 
Imagine you go to a baseball game.  At the game, you notice that at different times, the 
players are playing with different colors of baseballs:  white baseballs and blue baseballs.  
Later, you are asked what color baseballs they used.  You might first recall the blue 
baseballs—they deviated enough from your expectancy so that you encoded it more deeply 
in your memory.  But you will also easily recall the white baseballs.  For the white balls, 
you stored the memory loosely because it matched your mental expectancy. (Macrae et al., 
supra note __ at 65 discusses this encoding).  Overall then, while stereotypes have 
facilitated your memory of the white baseballs, your experience was unique enough to 
generate a deeper level of memory storage for the blue baseballs.  The baseball experience, 
however, will not likely translate to memories of criminal legal stories.  That is because, 
even though we have race-based expectancies for certain crimes (e.g. violent crimes-
Black), hearing about a White person committing a violent crime will not be as cognitively 
surprising to us as seeing a blue baseball at a game.  Thus, while it is true that stereotype-
inconsistent information can sometimes be remembered more accurately (the blue baseball 
v. the white baseball), for less cognitively surprising occurrences (the White violent 
criminal v. the Black violent criminal), we will more easily revert to our memory 
stereotypes.  The results of the empirical study discussed infra, Section IV, appear to 
confirm this explanation.  But see Macrae, supra note __ (finding that, in the gender-
employment context, participants were more likely to correctly remember names that had 
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stereotypes and memory is even stronger when looking at memory distortions 
such as false memories.  Memory scholars have explained that people are more 
likely to generate false memories when they are consistent with stereotypes 
they have about the memory subject, actor and situation.134 The tendency of 
false memories and stereotypes to go hand in hand emerges because people 
tend to misremember things that are loosely stored in the brain.135 Stereotype 
consistent information is stored in broad schemas rather than deeply encoded in 
the human memory.136 When people recall certain information that is part of a 
web of existing schemas and stereotypes, they may erroneously (and 
unknowingly) create additional memories (of things that never happened) that 
are consistent with those stereotypes. 
 
Studies show how stereotypes are implicated both in memory recall and in 
memory distortion.  A recent study by Jeanine Skorinko and her colleagues on 
memory recall demonstrates how racial stereotypes influence people’s 
memories of crimes.137 In the study, participants were presented scenarios of 
two stereotypically white crimes (ecstasy usage and identity fraud), two 
stereotypically black crimes (crack cocaine usage and shoplifting), and two 
stereotypically neutral crimes (marijuana usage and joyriding).138 The race of 
the crime perpetrator in the stories was varied.  After reading the stories, 
participants were asked to recall crime information by matching the race of the 
perpetrator with the crime.  Results indicated that participants were more likely 
to recall the race of the Defendant when the crime matched the racial 
stereotypes of that defendant.  For example, for hate crimes, participants were 
more likely to recall the race of a Caucasian perpetrator than an African 
American perpetrator.  The study shows that racial stereotypes can 
systematically affect jurors’ (unconscious) recollections in the legal setting, 
and that jurors may exhibit better recall of information about stereotypical 
criminals and crimes.139 
been paired with stereotype inconsistent occupations); C. Stangor & D. McMillan, Memory 
For Expectancy-Congruent and Expectancy-Incongruent Information:  A Review of the 
Social and Social Developmental Literatures, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 42 (1992)(finding that 
stereotype-inconsistent information is recalled more accurately under certain conditions).   
134 Skorinko et al., supra note __. 
135 Lenton et al., supra note __. 
136 Id.
137 Skorinko et al,  supra note __.  A stereotype is “a cognitive representation of the 
ideas, facts and images that are associated with a social group.”  See Lenton et al., supra 
note __ at 3.   
138 Skorinko et al., supra note __.  The researchers pre-tested race-crime stereotypes to 
confirm the racial stereotype categorization. 
139 Skorinko and her colleagues’ results indicated that racial minorities are not always 
on the short end of the memory stick.  For example, Caucasians were more frequently 
remembered to have committed hate crime. The results of the study indicate that the biased 
connection is not directly between race and memory, but instead it is between stereotype 
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Skorinko and her colleagues’ study indicates that accuracy of recall can be 
influenced by stereotype consistency.  A study by Alison Lenton and her 
colleagues expands the influence of stereotypes to include false memories.140 
They presented participants with a list of words,141 some of which were 
stereotypic of women (such as secretary and nurse) and others of which were 
stereotypic of men (such as lawyer and soldier).  After giving a distraction task, 
participants were given a recognition test.142 Results showed that participants 
used gender stereotypes in creating false memories.  That is, they more often 
(incorrectly) reported that they had seen gender-stereotyped words than non 
gender stereotyped words. Results also indicated that these false memories 
were elicited implicitly.  Despite the nature of their errors, participants were 
completely unaware of the gender stereotype theme of the word lists.143 The 
researchers expressed concern that the implicit creation of stereotype-
consistent false memories may help to explain the “self-perpetuating nature of 
stereotypes and their resistance to change.”144 
Studies on the influence of “cognitive busyness” on stereotypes and false 
memories indicate that even more false memories are generated when people 
are under stress, distracted, older, or otherwise cognitively busy.145 
and memory.  Nonetheless, because of the deep connection between minorities and 
negative stereotypes (and because violent crimes are stereotypical of African Americans), 
the unfortunate effects of memory stereotype biases frequently falls upon African 
Americans and other minority groups rather than on Caucasians. 
140 Lenton et. al., supra note ___.  See also Macrae et al., supra note (corroborating 
these results for false memory generation). 
141 All participants were shown fifty words that constituted gender neutral roles and 
fifteen words that were gender stereotyped.  Of these fifteen words, half of the participants 
received female stereotype roles and half received male stereotype roles.   To make the 
gender context non obvious, the gender specific stereotype roles were mixed in among the 
other fifty words.  Id. at 6. 
142 Id. at 6. 
143 Id. at 10.  The percentage awareness was slightly higher in the researcher’s first 
experiment (of two).  Nonetheless, the researchers considered the low awareness levels in 
both experiments to support a theory of implicit activation of stereotype-consistent 
information. 
144 Id. at 12. 
145 Macrae et al., supra note __ at 71. Stress, fatigue, and divided attention have all 
been shown to impair a person’s recall ability.  Even the aging process can lead to more 
false memories.  As people age, their frontal lobe brain function decreases, and they 
become more likely to rely heavily on schemas at the expense of more detailed encoding 
processes.  Macrae et al, supra note __ at 72. This schema reliance translates into 
stereotype consistent false memories. Older adults will thus generate more stereotype-
consistent false memories than younger adults.  Age effects increase in severity along with 
time-delay effects (delay between intake of information and the recall of that information), 
another type of executive dysfunction. Macrae et al., supra note __, at 71 citing W. 
Koutstaal & Daniel Schacter, Gist-based False Recognition of Pictures in Older and 
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Recognizing that previous memory studies on stereotype consistency and false 
memory had been tested using study participants whose cognitive energy was 
exclusively on the task at hand, Macrae and his colleagues ran a study to test 
how attention depletion affects false memories and stereotype consistency.  
They employed a gender-occupation methodology that resembled Lenton and 
her colleagues’ word pair study.146 However, in this study, both older and 
younger adults were tested, and half of the younger adult participants were 
given a simultaneous task to complete while they viewed the pairings of names 
and occupations.147 The purpose of the simultaneous task (which consisted of 
counting backwards by 3’s from 2000) was to split the participants’ attention 
between the memory task and the counting task.  Thus, the experimenters could 
test how decreased attention affects false memories and stereotypes.148 As 
expected, the results indicated that attention depleted participants were less 
accurate in their memories than full attention participants.149 In addition, the 
results showed that attention depleted young adults as well as full attention 
older adults committed more stereotype-consistent memory errors than full 
attention young adults.150 
In discussing the implications of their research findings on false memories 
and stereotype-consistency, Macrae and his colleagues surmised that “the 
creation of false memories may provide yet another avenue through which 
perceivers can bolster their pre-existing beliefs about the world,” an 
implication they found “sobering.”151 In the legal context, the study’s results 
are similarly troubling.  Rarely are judges and jurors focusing on one piece of 
information at a time.  Age, multiple jury instructions, detailed factual 
 
Younger Adults, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (1997).  Many researchers link age 
differences in false memories to frontal lobe brain function.  Id. at 72. While older people 
typically experience more memory errors than younger people, some younger people, such 
as those with poor reading comprehension skills, have a propensity for false memories.  See 
Id. at 77, citing R. DeBeni et al., Increases in Intrusion Errors and Working Memory 
Deficit of Poor Comprehenders, 52 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 305 (1998). 
146 See notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
147 None of the older adults were given the attention depletion.  Researchers only 
depleted the attention of a group of younger adults because they theorized that attention 
depleted young adults make similar stereotype-consistent false errors to older adults giving 
full attention.  See Id. at 72. 
148 Legal commentators can analogize attention depletion to the concept of cognitive 
overload in juries.  See J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision-
Making After the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301 (discussing cognitive 
overload and other cognitive challenges in the context of post-Blakely increased juror 
responsibilities). 
149 Macrae et al., supra note __ at __. 
150 Id. at 74.   
151 Id. at 75. 
28 Forgotten Equality 25-Aug-06 
presentations, new, more complex legal standards,152 and conflicting testimony 
are all likely to add to cognitive depletion.  As a result, one can expect a 
significant amount of stereotype consistent memory errors to manifest in a 
legal setting. 
 
C.  Legal Memories Gone Wrong:  Source Attribution Errors. 
 
False memories are normal and can unconsciously propagate stereotypes.  
But what types of false memories are likely to emerge in legal decision 
making?  One particular type of error, called source attribution error, may help 
us understand how systematic memory bias may be implicated in legal 
decision-making.  While this memory error has sometimes been applied to 
eyewitness memory faults,153 it has not been discussed in the context of juror 
memory errors and unconscious racial bias.   
 
Gordon Allport and Leo Postman conducted an early and influential study 
that illustrated a source attribution error in the “telephone game.”154 In the 
study (which was not originally intended to be a memory study but a study 
about rumors), participants viewed a picture of a two passengers on a streetcar 
(one passenger was White and one was Black).  In the picture, the White 
passenger holds a razor blade and the Black passenger is empty-handed.  
Participants were then asked to describe the picture to other participants (who 
did not see the picture).  As participants in the study told and re-told the story 
to others, the story changed.  After the story had been re-told several times, 
participants reported that the Black passenger, not the White passenger held a 
razor blade.  The results of the study (which had originally focused on retelling 
accuracy) demonstrated a source attribution error—the razor blade possession 
shifted from one memory source (the White passenger) to another (the Black 
passenger).  Was it a coincidence that the source attribution error reflected 
stereotype consistency?  Quite unlikely.  Rather, the study more likely stands 
for the proposition that source attribution errors may be triggered by 
stereotypes.155 
Source attribution errors occur when a person places the source of one 
memory into another setting, creating an incorrect source of another 
 
152 See e.g. Prescott & Starr, supra note __. 
153 See infra note ___ for a brief discussion of studies investigating eyewitness 
memory.   
154 GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO J. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947). 
155 See Skorinko et al, supra note __ at 6.  A recent study by Richard Marsh and his 
colleagues supports this proposition.  In that study, the researchers found that participants 
attributed sources of memory in a manner consistent with gender and sexual orientation 
stereotypes.  Richard L. Marsh et al., Gender and Orientation Stereotypes Bias Source-
Monitoring Attributions, 14 MEMORY 148 (2006). 
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memory.156 In the context of eyewitness identification, the concerns created by 
source attribution errors are powerful and easy to conceptualize.157 A victim of 
a crime or an eyewitness might unknowingly transfer the memory of a person 
or face into another context.158 Shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing in 
1995, for example, 159 a massive search commenced for John Doe #2,160 a 
“young square-faced man with dark hair and a stocky build wearing a blue and 
white cap.”161 John Doe #2’s description came from a mechanic who had seen 
Timothy McVeigh rent a van before the bombing.  After a massive search, it 
turned out that there was no John Doe #2.  The mechanic had simply confused 
another van rental transaction with McVeigh’s rental.  The other rental 
transaction had involved two men, one of whom resembled McVeigh.  The 
second man was a stocky square-faced man.  The mechanic had unconsciously 
transferred memory of John Doe #2 from one context to another.162 
156 See Schacter, supra note __. 
157 Francis A. Gilligan et al., The Theory of "Unconscious Transference": The Latest 
Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L. 
REV. 107, 123-24 (1996).  For a comprehensive discussion of memory issues in eyewitness 
identification, see Ralph Norman Haber & Lyn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering, and 
Reporting Events, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1057 (2000). In addition to studies on 
source attribution errors, studies on memory in eyewitness testimony have also connected 
memory errors to racial bias.  These studies indicate that memory errors may occur 
particularly when perpetrators are out-group members. Another prominent discussion of 
memories in the eyewitness context is the role of repressed memories, including the 
reemergence of repressed memories through the use of hypnosis.  A wide variety of 
psychological and legal articles have discussed repressed memories.  See, e.g. JENNIFER J. 
FREYD, BETRAYAL TRAUMA: THE LOGIC OF FORGETTING CHILDHOOD ABUSE (1996); 
Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 518 (1993).  
The “own race bias,” for example, demonstrates that people can discriminate better 
between faces of their own ethnic group than faces of other ethnic groups.  Bartol & Bartol, 
supra note __ at __.  For a discussion of own race bias in the context of legal rules, see 
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. 
REV. 934 (1984). Research has repeatedly found that White participants are more accurate 
in identifying White faces than Black faces.  These studies have not found a connection 
between explicit racial attitudes and memory of out-group races, indicating that own-race 
bias operates implicitly.  A meta-analysis of thirty years of studies on own-race bias 
confirmed that racial attitudes do not serve as predictors of own-race bias. Christian A. 
Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory 
for Faces:  A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 3 (2001) (analyzing data 
from 39 separate studies on own-race bias). When analyzed in the context of juror memory, 
these studies suggest not only that juror memory may be subject to unconscious memory 
biases, but also that such biases cannot be predicted by identifying explicitly biased jurors.  
158 These types of errors are well documented and have been discussed in terms of 
evidentiary laws. Gilligan et al, supra note __. 
159 This example was given by Schacter, supra note __ at __.   
160 Timothy McVeigh was John Doe #1.  Id.
161 See Schacter, supra note __ (giving a more detailed description of this Oklahoma 
City bombing attribution error). 
162 Id. at 92. According to Schacter, the source of the mechanic’s memory error was 
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If source attribution errors can cause faulty eyewitness identifications, they 
can also cause jurors to falsely recall case facts by attributing evidentiary facts 
to the wrong party without recognizing it (as illustrated by Allport and 
Postman’s study). Recall The Confrontation story from the beginning of this 
Article.  In attempting to remember the story, some readers might have 
believed that Tyronne kicked James.  Such an error would constitute a source 
attribution error (because Tyronne’s friend kicked James, not Tyronne).  
Memory researchers have pointed out that, as demonstrated by Allport and 
Postman’s results, source attribution errors can systematically occur in ways 
driven by stereotypes.  Using an analogy from West Side Story, Jeffrey 
Sherman and his colleagues noted that “stereotype driven errors in source 
memory may lead you to falsely remember that the Sharks rather than the Jets 
committed homicide…”163 
D.   Connecting Memories to Decision-Making 
 
If implicit biases affect judge and juror memories of case facts, do these 
biases also affect legal outcomes?164 Making such a connection requires 
linking the cognitive process of memory to decision-making itself.  Put simply, 
if biased memories do not create biased outcomes, our concern should be 
moderated.  To date, no empirical studies have tested the effects of implicitly 
biased memories on legal decision-making outcomes.  Inside and outside the 
legal setting, however, the crucial role of memories in decision-making has 
 
“unconscious transference.”  Francis Gilligan and colleagues clarify that unconscious 
transference is closely related to source attribution errors, which they claim is the more 
accurate psychology terminology.  See Gilligan et al., supra note __ at 116.  For purposes 
of this Article, to avoid confusion in terminology, I use source attribution error and 
unconscious transference interchangeably. According to Elizabeth Loftus, source 
attribution errors result from the malleable nature of human memory and allow 
eyewitnesses to confidently conclude that the wrong person committed a crime. Id., citing 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979). Unconscious transference is a well 
documented and accepted phenomenon.  According to Bartol and Bartol, two surveys 
indicate that between 81-84.5% of psychologists believe that evidence of unconscious 
transference is reliable enough to be presented in court. Id., citing Saul M. Kassin et al, The 
“General Acceptance” of Psychologcial Research on Eyewitness Testimony:  A Survey of 
the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1089 (1989); Saul M. Kassin et al., On The “General 
Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 405 (2001).  
163 Jeffrey W. Sherman et al., Bearing False Witness Under Pressure: Implicit and 
Explicit Components of Stereotype-Driven Memory Distortions, 21 SOC. COGNITION 213, 
243 (2003).  The researchers point out the legal dangers of such a source transference, 
focusing on faulty eyewitness identification. 
164 This question resembles an early challenge to implicit social cognition work.  The 
challenge questioned the connection between implicit attitudes and behavior.  That is, do 
people with implicit biases act on them?  Evidence has indicated that implicit bias does 
lead to action.  See Kang, supra note __. 
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been well documented.165 Thus, it is quite likely that biased memory processes 
result in biased legal decisions. 
 
Cognitive psychological research has demonstrated the importance of 
factual memory and recall to a variety of decision-making models.  Nancy 
Pennington and Reid Hastie developed a “Story Model” of jury decision-
making, a well regarded framework of jury information processing and 
decision-making that focuses on understanding how jurors process 
information.166 According to Pennington and Hastie, the first step for jurors in 
information processing is constructing an “explanatory model” (or story) of 
case facts.167 During the next step, jurors attempt to memorize and understand 
the judicial instructions of verdict categories.168 Finally, they attempt to fit 
their “story” into the judicial instructions.169 Because of the prominent role of 
story formation in this decision-making model, if memory errors taint the 
content of the story when it is formed or recalled, they will likely be preserved.  
These errors will remain in the stories as jurors incorporate the story into the 
judicial instructions and ultimately make decisions.170 
Research outside of the legal field supports the argument that memory 
functioning is crucial to decision-making.  Focusing on models in the decision 
sciences (sometimes called “human judgment and decision making”), Elke 
Weber and his colleagues argued that memory insights, particularly related to 
the encoding process of information into memory, are crucial to judgment and 
 
165 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological 
Research on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
90, 95 (1990).  See also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation Based Decision 
Making:  Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 521 (1988); Michael R. P. Dougherty et al., Memory as 
a Fundamental Heuristic for Decision Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION RESEARCH 125 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau, eds., 2003) (noting 
that previous models often fail to account for a variety of empirical findings linking 
memory to various facets of decision-making). 
166 See Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1138 (2001) (calling Pennington and Hastie’s theory a “widely 
accepted” model of jury decision-making). See also Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, 
Sexual Harassment Stories:  Testing a Story-Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Making in 
Civil Litigation, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (2003) (confirming, critiquing and expanding 
Pennington & Hastie’s model); Reid Hastie, The Role of "Stories" in Civil Jury Judgments,
32 MICH. J. L. REF. 227 (1999).  
167 Pennington & Hastie, supra note __ (1990).  See also Pennington & Hastie, supra 
note __ (1988).  
168 Pennington & Hastie, supra note __ (1990) at __. 
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors Decisions, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 991, 
1007 (claiming that juror emotional processes can influence memories and thus stories that 
jurors construct). 
32 Forgotten Equality 25-Aug-06 
decision-making models.171 Highlighting the importance of a memory-focused 
inquiry into decision-making, Weber and his colleagues proposed that 
“memory can be used the way physicists use cloud chambers:  to study 
otherwise unobservable events via the residue they leave behind.”172 In this 
vein, this Article examines memories for racial residue in the legal context.   
 
Another decision-making model that highlights the importance of memory 
is one developed by Michael Dougherty and his colleagues.173 This model 
contains three stages:  (1) representational properties, (2) retrieval from 
memory, and (3) experience and domain knowledge.  The first two of these 
stages illustrate that memory may fundamentally alter decision-making at 
multiple points in the legal decision-making process.174 The representation 
stage focuses on two complementary ways in which memory is stored in the 
mind, instance-based and abstraction-based representations.  In instance-based 
representations, individual memories are encoded and stored separately as 
specific memory traces.175 In abstraction-based representations, summaries of 
stimuli or events are stored such that only “important” information is encoded 
(smaller details are lost).176 According to Dougherty and colleagues, both 
types of representations are important for understanding and predicting 
ultimate decisions.  Poor encoding quality on instance-based representations 
 
171 Elke U. Weber et al., And Let Us Not Forget Memory:  The Role of Memory 
Processes and Techniques in the Study of Judgment and Choice, in DECISION MAKING,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 
33, 35 (J. Busemeyer et al., eds 1995) (citing concern in the judgment and decision-making 
field that the focus of the field may be too narrow).  Weber and his colleagues point out 
that Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory includes an “editing phase” that was based 
upon memory and coding operations.  Id. at 36. 
172 Id. at 36-37. 
173 Michael R. P. Dougherty et al., Memory as a Fundamental Heuristic for Decision 
Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 125 (Sandra 
L. Schneider & James Shanteau, eds., 2003)(noting that previous models often fail to 
account for a variety of empirical findings linking memory to various facets of decision-
making).  For another model of decision-making that highlights the inclusion of memory, 
see Valerie F. Reyna et al., Memory, Development, and Rationality:  An Integrative Theory 
of Judgment and Decision-Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION RESEARCH 201 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau, eds., 2003).  See also 
Elke U. Weber et al., Beyond Strategies:  Implications of Memory Representation and 
Memory Processes for Models of Judgments and Decision-Making, in RELATING THEORY 
TO DATA: ESSAYS ON HUMAN MEMORY IN HONOR OF BENNET B. MURDOCK 75 (W. E. 
Hockley & S. Lewandowski, eds. 1991). 
174 Dougherty and his colleagues argue that all three stages connect memory to 
decision making.  For purposes of this Article, I only focus on the first two.   One could, 
however, connect the experiential stage to legal decision-making, particularly when 
examining the role of memories in judges’ decisions. 
175 Id. at 131. 
176 Id.
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can have major effects on later judgments.177 For example, it can lead people 
to underestimate the frequency of stimuli or to miscalculate probability 
judgments.178 Abstraction-based representations, as relied upon in Pennington 
and Hastie’s story-based model, similarly can lead to variability in decision-
making problems.179 One example of the impact of abstraction-based 
representations on ultimate decisions comes from the generation of cognitive 
errors such as framing effects.180 
The retrieval from memory stage focuses on biases and errors that arise 
when people recall information.  These errors, in turn, can affect decision-
making.  For example, retrieval can be compromised by ordering effects, such 
as the primacy effect.  An early example of primary effect was demonstrated 
by research on people’s impressions of others.  This research showed that 
people develop more positive impressions of others when they learn positive 
information about those people ahead of negative information.181 When they 
learn negative information first, more negative impressions follow, even when 
the total mix of information is the same.  This phenomenon emerged because 
of a memory bias—people are most likely to remember whatever information 
comes first.  Memory biases can therefore affect decision-making in the 
retrieval from memory stage.  At each of the first two stages of Dougherty and 
his colleagues’ model, then, memory errors have a systematic effect on 
decision-making.   
 
In light of the compelling research linking memory to decision-making, the 
connection between implicit memory biases and legal decision-making 
processes becomes even more intimate.  If implicit memory biases affect judge 
or juror encoding or retrieval of information, such effects are likely to carry 
 
177 Id. at 133. 
178 Id. at 133. 
179 Id. at 136, citing Pennington & Hastie, supra note __ (1988) 
180 Id. at 137, citing V.F. Reyna & C.F. Brainerd, Fuzzy Trace Theory of Framing 
Effects in Choice, Presented at the 30th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomics Society, 
Atlanta (1989); V.F. Reyna & C.F. Brainerd, Fuzzy Trace Theory and Framing Effects in 
Choice:  Gist Extraction, Truncation, and Conversion, 4 J. BEHAV. DEC. MK’G 249 (1991).  
Various legal scholars have focused on the legal impact of framing effects.  See, e.g., Chris 
Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI L. REV. 163 
(2000); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and 
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995); Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures 
Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the 
Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797 (2005).  These scholars, 
however, generally overlook the role of abstraction-based memory processes in framing 
effects. 
181 Id. at 141 (citing N. H. Anderson & S. Hubert, Effects of Concomitant Verbal Recall 
on Order Effects in Personality Impression Formation, 2 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL 
BEHAV. 379 (1963)). 
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through to legal decision-making.  
 
E.  Can Deliberations Cure Memory Errors? 
 
The research discussed above indicates that memory plays an integral role 
in human decision-making processes.  Nonetheless, most of the studies 
described have focused on individual decision-making.  While judges (except 
those who sit on panels) certainly engage in individual decision-making, juries 
make decisions as groups.  Thus, before concluding that individual memory 
biases affect legal outcomes, one must first look at research on the relationship 
between individual and group decision-making.182 Such scholarship indicates 
that group decision-making processes typically do not alter already completed 
individual decision-making.  As a result, memory errors made by individual 
jurors are preserved rather than corrected.183 
Pennington and Hastie’s “Story Model” of decision-making helps us 
evaluate whether jury deliberations are likely to correct memory biases.  This 
model has identified two styles of juries, those that are “evidence driven” and 
those that are “verdict driven.”184 One style of jury has an opportunity to 
correct memory errors while another does not.  According to Pennington and 
Hastie, “evidence-driven” juries first come to agreement about the story in 
order to reconcile different juror stories about what happened.185 Juries that 
 
182 A variety of studies have investigated whether racial discrimination occurs in legal 
verdicts.  Most of these studies focus on the outcome of the legal question, whether or not a 
criminal defendant is guilty or not guilty, but do not focus on bias in the decision-making 
process.  Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth quantitatively evaluated the scholarship 
on race and legal decision-making.  Samuel R. Sommers & Pheobe C. Ellsworth, How 
Much Do We Really Know about Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and 
Research, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003).  Their study indicated that existing studies on 
jury decision-making and race reveals “less…than meets the eye.”  Some studies, however, 
reveal outcome differences based on race.  See Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock 
Juror Decision-Making:  A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 39 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 621 (2005) (finding small but significant differences in race effects on verdicts); 
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Descrimination:  Measuring the Effects of 
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993).   Studies outside of the legal 
context reveal a complex relationship between decision-making in racial contexts and the 
(non-racial) explanations given by decision-makers.  See Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed 
Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision 
Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36 (2006). 
183 In some cases, jury deliberations have been argued to aggravate, rather than 
ameliorate, biases.  See Prescott & Starr, supra note __.  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Group 
Judgments:  Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
962 (2005) (discussing a variety of problems that arise in group deliberative processes). 
184 Pennington & Hastie, supra note __.   
185 Pennington & Hastie, supra note __ at 99 (1990).  See also REID HASTIE ET AL., 
INSIDE THE JURY (1983).  
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engage in this type of decision-making process might have the cognitive 
opportunity to correct memory errors.  “Verdict driven” juries, on the other 
hand, skip the early story stages and move ahead to the verdict stage.  In doing 
so, they likely preserve individual juror’s stories of the evidence, thus 
solidifying memory errors that have been incorporated into their stories.  
Overall then, Pennington and Hastie’s model indicates that some jury types 
have an opportunity to correct memory errors, but others do not. 
 
Research by Mary Pritchard and Janice Keenan indicates that jury 
deliberation often fails to correct memory errors, casting doubt upon whether 
“evidence driven” juries take advantage of the opportunity to improve 
memories during the story reconciliation stage. Interested in how successful the 
jury deliberation process is in correcting false memories of individual jurors, 
Pritchard and Keenan examined whether deliberations worked to reduce or 
eliminate memory errors.186 They measured how event memories were initially 
formed and how they changed during the course of deliberations.  Results 
indicated that deliberation only slightly improved memory errors (even though 
participants only accurately remembered 60% of the information tested)187 and 
that the most vocal and dominant jurors were not always the ones with the most 
accurate memories.188 They also found that those jurors who were more likely 
to change their verdict were jurors with less confidence in their memories, but 
not those with the least accurate memories.189 The researchers concluded that 
courts’ assumptions that deliberation improves memory “is only weakly 
supported.”190 Another study by Pritchard and Keenan indicates that we cannot 
rely on individual jurors themselves to catch or correct their memory errors.191 
In that study, Pritchard and Keenan tested mock juror memory accuracy as well 
as confidence in the accuracy of their memories.192 Results indicated that 
jurors who were the most confident in their memories were not the most 
accurate.193 These studies indicate that if individual juror memories are 
 
186 Pritchard & Keenan, supra note __ (2002).   
187 Id. at 600.  This 60% may be significantly higher than in real trials.  As Pritchard 
and Keenan point out, the trial they used in the study lasted only thirty five minutes long 
and participants were college students (who “tend to have better memories than the typical 
jury pool”). 
188 Id at 595, 600.   
189 Id at 600.  The authors concluded that the assumption that jury deliberation  
190 Id.
191 Pritchard & Keenan, supra note __ (1999). 
192 Pritchard & Keenan, supra note __  (1999). 
193 Id. at 161. Participants, however, were fairly accurate in their ex-post assessments 
of their memories. These results mirror one of the major flaws encountered in eyewitness 
testimony—that jurors erroneously assume that confident eyewitnesses are the most 
accurate ones.  See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the 
Suspect”:  Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience,
82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 361 (1998). 
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tarnished by unconsciously biased recall errors and false memories, then 
neither self monitoring nor jury deliberation are likely to significantly improve 
the problem. 
 
Taken as a whole, research on human memory processes indicates that 
people systematically and unconsciously make stereotype-driven memory 
errors.  It also indicates that these errors are likely to affect decision-making 
and that the nature of group deliberations is unlikely to help. 
 
IV. FORGOTTEN EQUALITY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
In order to test whether unconscious racial bias manifests in the accuracy of 
juror memories, I employed an empirical study designed to examine whether 
people’s recollections of legal stories are shaped by the race of the actors in the 
stories.  The test revealed a variety of systematic and implicitly biased memory 
errors.  This Section presents the methodology and results of the study. 
 
Before conducting the study, I made the following hypotheses: 
 
(1) The accuracy of participants’ memories in recalling legal stories would 
be affected by the race of the actors in the stories;  
(2) Participants would make memory errors in a manner harmful to African 
Americans and Hawaiians but helpful to Caucasians; and 
(3) Participants who exhibit more explicit bias would not necessarily be 
those who exhibit more implicit bias. 
 
A.  Methods 
 
Participants. 153 undergraduate students in a psychology course at the 
University of Hawai'i participated in the study for course credit.  The average 
age of the participants was 21.74 years.  71.2% of the participants were 
women.   
 
Materials. Participants read two unrelated stories.  One story described the 
circumstances surrounding a fistfight (a story I called The Confrontation194), 
and the other detailed circumstances surrounding an employee who was 
terminated.  After reading the stories, participants returned the stories to an 
experimenter and were given a questionnaire that contained a brief “distraction 
task.”  The distraction task was designed to take approximately 5-10 minutes, 
and was composed primarily of word completion questions and analytical 
 
194 The story name or even the existence of a story name, of course, was not part of 
information given to participants. 
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reasoning questions.  The goal of the distraction task, as is common in memory 
recall studies, was to eliminate immediate memory effects (those that would 
only linger a few minutes).  After completing the distraction task, participants 
were asked to answer questions about the stories they read.  The stories were: 
 
Story 1:   
Brenda, a 28 year old Caucasian woman, worked as a “purchasing clerk” 
in the corporate offices of Big Burger Company, a small chain of hamburger 
joints.  Brenda represented the second generation of her family to work at the 
offices of Big Burger Company.  In fact, her father was once employee of the 
month at the company.  Brenda’s job required that she work five days a week 
for eight hours a day.  She was permitted one hour for lunch and two fifteen 
minute breaks.  Another employee, Jimmy, shared a cubicle with Brenda.  
Jimmy, who worked for the public relations department as a marketing clerk, 
was occasionally sloppy with his work.  Sometimes, when he was unable to 
complete the work assigned, Brenda helped him with his projects, which 
usually involved using the web to generate internet publicity and create new 
business.  Jimmy and Brenda even occasionally dined together in Big Burger’s 
company cafeteria, where Jimmy always ate burgers and french fries. 
 
While at her desk, in addition to conducting her duties, Brenda frequently 
surfed the web and wrote an internet “blog,” a journal that chronicled her 
daily life as a corporate purchasing clerk.  Surfing the web for personal 
business was listed as a prohibited activity by the Big Burger Employee 
Handbook.  Despite her web surfing, Brenda routinely worked longer hours 
than was required of her, and always finished her assigned work.  In addition, 
her high quality work was documented by her boss, who consistently filed 
reports praising her hard work, intellect, and dedication.  Brenda did, 
however, occasionally make long-distance phone calls from her work phone.  
She also occasionally let her friend, who worked in the shipping department, 
come and surf the web on her computer, so long as he did it during his fifteen 
minute breaks. 
 
Brenda had an employment agreement with Big Burger Company that 
stated:  “The Company shall not terminate the Employee without good cause, 
such as the commission of a felony or other morally questionable actions.”  
One day, Brenda posted a web blog that said:  “Big Burgers should be called 
Blah Burgers.  The burgers are so darn boring I wouldn’t eat them if I didn’t 
get them for free.”  Even though her blog was anonymous, Jimmy saw her 
posting the message.  The next day, the company announced that Brenda’s boss 
had been promoted to another office.  Brenda’s new boss came and introduced 
himself.  He told Brenda that his performance expectations were extremely 
high for her, and that he wouldn’t tolerate substandard work or any other 
insubordination.  Brenda was fired five days later.  At first she received no 
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explanation, but was later sent a letter stating that she failed to meet the 
“expected standards of employee conduct.” 
Story 2:  
William, a 23 year old Caucasian man, first encountered James, a 30 year 
old plumber, when they accidentally bumped elbows in a crowded bar.  In the 
accident, James spilled beer onto William’s shirt and shorts.  William was 
angry but the encounter ended when a bar employee took him by the arm and 
led him away.  As William walked away with the bar employee, James smiled 
at William and chuckled.  An hour after leaving the bar, William and a friend 
spotted James outside a local diner.  They approached James slowly, and 
William said:  “Why did you bump into me back there?”  James said nothing 
and just looked down.  William and his friend moved closer to James and 
William repeated his question.  James said:  “Hey listen …it sounds like you 
had too much to drink…you don’t handle your liquor too well.  Let it go.”  
William and his friend looked at each other and started laughing.  William’s 
friend took a step towards James and said:  “What if we won’t let it go?”  
When he took another step towards James, James moved forward, shoved him 
with both hands, and said: “Get out of my face.” Without hesitating, William 
then stepped forward and tried to shove James in the chest, but missed and hit 
him in the face.  James fell back slightly.  He then turned around, took a couple 
steps away from William, and appeared to reach for something in his pocket.  
William quickly pursued James from behind and punched him in the side of the 
head.  James fell to the ground.  William’s friend stepped forward and kicked 
James.  William and his friend then walked away quickly and quietly. 
 
After completing the distraction tasks, participants were asked to read and 
respond to sixteen recall questions about each of the stories.  Participants were 
instructed to circle “yes” next to facts that were accurately reported from the 
story.  If a fact did not accurately describe a fact from the story, or if the fact 
was not in the story at all, participants were instructed to circle “no”.195 
The yes/no questions were designed with testable purposes in mind.  For 
the fight scenario, the sixteen questions presented were composed of six actor 
aggression questions, six mitigating circumstances questions, and four neutral 
questions.  Aggressiveness questions described an aggressive action, such as:  
“William punched James from behind,” or “After James fell to the ground, 
William kicked him.”  Mitigating behavior questions described facts that would 
potentially justify the actor’s action or lessen his legal or moral responsibility.  
Mitigating statements included:  “After being punched, James took out an 
object from his pocket,” or “When William hit James in the face, he was really 
trying to push him rather than punch him.”  Aggressiveness and mitigating 
 
195 These dependent variable measures are reproduced in their entirety in Appendix A. 
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behavior question indexes were split into two smaller indexes:  one for accurate 
statements (to test for recall errors) and one for inaccurate statements (to test 
for false memories).     
 
For the employment termination scenario, six questions were designed as 
actor favorable questions (facts relating to good job performance), six were 
designed as actor unfavorable questions (facts relating to bad job performance), 
and four were designed as actor neutral questions.  Half of the questions 
accurately described facts from the story (thereby testing recall accuracy) and 
half did not (thereby testing false memories). 
 
Because of the design of the questions, participant responses could be 
analyzed to determine not simply the accuracy of people’s memories, but also 
whether errors in memory could systematically demonstrate that unconscious 
racial bias manifests in legal decision-making processes.  For example, if 
participants who read about an African American employee more frequently 
falsely recalled that she had received mixed reviews from superiors, while 
participants who read about a Caucasian employee more frequently (correctly) 
recalled that she had received positive reviews, it would indicate that the race 
of the employee affected participants’ memories in racially biased ways. 
 
The primary independent variable was the race of the protagonist of the 
story.196 For the employment story, participants read either about Brenda, a 
Caucasian woman, Keisha, an African American woman, or Ka’olu, a 
Hawaiian woman.  For the fight story, participants read about either William, a 
Caucasian man, Tyronne, an African-American man, or Kawika, a Hawaiian 
man.  Participants were randomly assigned to a race category.197 Other than 
the names and races of the actors, the stories were identical. 
 
To date, most empirical studies on race and law typically have used a 
Black-White study paradigm.198 While this paradigm reflects both historical 
and present-day discrimination, it is an incomplete attempt to understand the 
complex nature of culture and discrimination.  The increasing diversity within 
 
196Legal culture/Non-Legal Culture was another independent variable.  Results for that 
variable, however, were not systematic and are not discussed in this Article.  Future 
projects will continue to examine the effects of this variable.  For a discussion of legal 
culture and its effects, see Levinson, supra note __. 
197 Participants read about actors of the same race in both stories.  For example, 
participants who read about Tyronne also read about Keisha.  This was done in order to 
reduce the chances that participants would recognize what was being tested. 
198 See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note __ (reviewing a variety of mock jury 
studies).  But see, e.g., Harmon M. Hosch et al., A Comparison of Anglo-American and 
Mexican-American Jurors’ Judgments of Mothers Who Fail to Protect Their Children 
From Abuse, 21 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1681 (1991). 
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the United States199 requires attention to a broader scope of racial and cultural 
diversity in empirical legal studies.200 In addition to testing the traditional 
Black-White paradigm, the current study investigated how unconscious 
discrimination may manifest in memory processes relating to Hawaiians.  
Although the population of Hawaiians is not large outside of the state of 
Hawai'i, the recent history of the Hawaiian people is complex, meaningful, and 
can demonstrate the power of stereotypes in the legal context.201 By 
conducting the empirical study in Hawai'i, the study could achieve three goals 
that would be difficult elsewhere:  (1) the linkages between Hawaiians and 
implicit memory bias could be investigated in a culturally and legally relevant 
context; (2) African American bias and stereotypes could be examined in a 
community with a historically small African American population202 (finding 
implicit biases against African Americans in Hawai'i would tend to illustrate 
the power of unconscious racism and its propagation through external sources 
such as media); and (3) biases and stereotypes could be tested among a diverse 
population, which would indicate that implicit biases are manifested in the 
legal setting by a broader (not just Caucasian) juror population.203 
199 See U.S. Census Bureau, US Interim Projections by Age Sex Race, and Hispanic 
Origin, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/ (last visited Aug. 2006) (displaying 
population projections until 2050, based on numbers in 2000 census). 
200 Studies outside of the law, particularly using the IAT, have incorporated a wide 
range of studies testing implicit biases that spans well beyond the Black-White paradigm.  
https://implicit.harvard.edu (last visited Aug. 2006) (offering IATs testing implicit 
attitudes regarding Arabs and Muslims, Native Americans, and Asian Americans, among 
others). 
201 For more on the challenges faced by the Hawaiian community in the legal system, 
see, e.g. NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 
1991); Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. 
& POL'Y REV. 95, 102 & n. 41 (1998); Chris K. Iijima, Race over Rice: Binary Analytical 
Boxes and a Twenty-First Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice 
v. Cayetano, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 91 (2000).  Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: 
Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1995); 
Le'a Malia Kanehe, Recent Development, The Akaka Bill: The Native Hawaiians' Race for 
Federal Recognition, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 857 (2001); Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred 
Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the 
Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai'i's Annexation, and Possible Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV.
463 (1995); Noelle M. Kahanu & Jon M. Van Dyke, Native Hawaiian Entitlement to 
Sovereignty: An Overview, 17 U. HAW L. REV. 427 (1995).   
202 There is, however, a meaningful history of African Americans in Hawaii.  See 
THEY FOLLOWED THE TRADE WINDS: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN HAWAII (Miles Jackson ed., 
2004). 
203 Many studies on race and juries have tested biases only among groups of Caucasian 
participants.  Based on the implicit theories I have described, a diverse group of 
participants might be just as susceptible to memory biases.  Due to its diverse population 
and university community, Hawai'i provides a natural place for such investigations.  In the 
study I conducted, only 28 participants were Caucasian.  This statistic would tend to 
indicate that results favoring Caucasians would not simply be driven by an in-group bias.203 
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After completing the recognition task, participants responded to the SDO 
scale.204 By testing participants on both the memory study and the SDO, I 
could examine the relationship, if any, between implicit memory bias and 
explicit racial preferences. The SDO scale used in this study was the 14-item 
SDO introduced by Pratto and her colleagues.  It included the following 
measures, among others:205 
1) Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others. 
2) This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all 
people were. 
3) It is important that we treat other countries as equals. 
4) If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems in 
this country. 
 
Participants were instructed to respond whether they had a positive or 
negative feeling about the items.  For each item, they assigned a score.  A score 
of “1” indicated very negative and a score of “7” indicated very positive.206 
B.  Results: Failed Memories and Racial Minorities 
 
Participants misremembered certain legally relevant facts in a racially 
biased manner.  The most telling results emerged from participant memories of 
The Confrontation. Systematic errors in recall affected participants’ memories 
of The Confrontation in a manner harmful to African Americans, and to a 
lesser extent, Hawaiians.  
 
See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note __ (pointing out that many studies of the influence 
of race on jury decision-making has only used Caucasian participants); Mitchell et al., 
supra, note __ (making a similar observation in the context of mock jury studies on racial 
bias).  Instead, it indicates that (pro-Caucasian or anti African-American) unconscious 
racial biases can be harbored across a variety of races.  
204 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
205 Here are the rest of the measures:  1) All humans should be treated equally. 2) 
Increased social equality. 3) Some people are just more worthy than others. 4) To get ahead 
in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others. 5) In an ideal world, all nations would 
be equal. 6) Some people are just more deserving than others. 7) Equality. 8) It is not a 
problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others. 9) Some people are just 
inferior to others. 10) Increased economic equality. 
206 Each number has its own label.  A score of “2” means “negative.”  A score of 3 
means “slightly negative.”  A score of 4 means “neither positive or negative.”  A score of 5 
means “slightly positive.”  A score of 6 means “positive.” In order to convert the responses 
into a total score, half of the measures were reverse coded (e.g. scores of 7 are converted to 
scores of 1) and the responses were totaled. 
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1. Remembering and Misremembering Aggression in The Confrontation. 
 
Participants had an easier time successfully recalling aggressive facts when 
the actor was African American compared to when the actor was Caucasian.207 
For example, participants who read about Tyronne had a recall accuracy rate of 
80.7%.  That is, they failed to recall just 19.3% of facts relating to aggressive 
actions.  Participants who read about Kawika failed to recall 29.0% of these 
facts, and participants who read about William failed to recall 31.5% of these 
facts.   Thus, participants were more likely to remember Tyronne’s aggressive 
behavior than William’s aggressive behavior, even when the facts were quite 
simple and only 15 minutes or so had elapsed since reading the facts.  See the 
Graph below.  Two instances detailing results of aggressive fact recall also help 
illustrate this finding208:
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Example 1 (Aggression- Failed Recall): “When they saw him outside a 
 
207 This result, indicated by a MANOVA, was significant, F (1, 145) = 4.16, p<.05. 
208 Chi-square analyses were performed on individual instances of fact recall.  These 
tests compared two measures:  (1) a race measure- comparing the three racial conditions 
against each other in one test, and (2) a major-minority measure- comparing the Caucasian 
condition to a combined group of the Hawaiian and African American conditions. 
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diner, William and his friend approached James.”209 
This fact, which would tend to indicate that the fight was initiated by 
William, accurately reflected information from the story.  Participants who 
read about Tyronne or Kawika were significantly more likely to correctly recall 
this information than participants who read about William.210 While a 
resounding 92% of participants who read about Tyronne or Kawika correctly 
recalled this aggressive action (just an 8% error rate), only 77% who read about 
William recalled it (a 23% error rate).211 
Example 2 (Aggression- Failed Recall): “Tyronne punched James from 
behind.”212 
This fact also accurately reflected information from the story.  Participants 
who read about Tyronne were more likely to correctly recall this fact compared 
to participants who read about William or Kawika.  Error rates near 50% 
indicate that participants in all groups had a difficult time remembering this 
fact.  Yet the error rates nonetheless point towards a race memory bias.  65% 
and 57% of the participants who read about Kawika and William, respectively 
failed to recall this aggressive fact, while just 41% who read about Tyronne 
failed to recall it.213 
Responses on the index of combined false memory questions did not 
generate a main effect.  However, a significant false memory effect did emerge 
on one of the three false memory measures.  This example indicates that false 
memories can manifest in the legal setting in biased ways: 
 
Example 3 (Aggression- False Memory): “After James said ‘Let it go,’ 
Tyronne replied by saying ‘What if we won’t let it go?’”214 
This statement inaccurately depicts information from the story and 
demonstrates the potential connection between false memories, source 
attribution errors, and implicit memory bias.215 Participants reading about 
Tyronne or Kawika were more likely to exhibit false memories for this fact 
 
209 Fight DV #14 
210 This finding was statistically significant, p<.05 
211 Appendix A  presents a chart of the results for all of the individual Examples 
presented in the Section. 
212 Fight DV #10. 
213 This finding was marginally significant, p= .055.   
214 Fight DV #5. 
215 Recall from The Confrontation that it was the actor’s friend, not the actor himself, 
who made that aggressive statement. 
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than participants reading about William.216 In fact, 70% of participants who 
read about Tyronne or Kawika mistakenly believed that the statement was 
accurate.  For participants reading about William, 56% believed it was 
accurate.  Thus, although the majority of participants mis-remembered this fact, 
participants reading about an African American or Hawaiian were significantly 
more likely to misremember it in a manner that harmed the defendant.   
 
2. Remembering and Misremembering Mitigating Factors in The 
Confrontation 
With respect to recall accuracy of mitigation questions, no significant index 
differences emerged based on race.  However, for false memories of mitigating 
circumstances, an unexpected result emerged.  Participants who read about 
Kawika were more likely to exhibit false memories of mitigating facts 
compared to participants reading about William or Tyronne.217 Participants 
who read about Kawika exhibited false memories for 50% of the inaccurate 
mitigating facts.  These facts, if true, would have tended to lessen Kawika’s 
legal or moral responsibility for the incident.  Participants who read about 
William and Tyronne exhibited false memories for fewer facts, 38% and 37% 
of these questions, respectively.  These results indicate that the nature of 
unconscious biases in memory recall are complex and can be multidirectional 
(they can simultaneously penalize and mitigate).  In recalling aggressive 
actions, participants’ memories sometimes worked to penalize Kawika.  But in 
recalling mitigating facts, participants’ memories sometimes worked to help 
Kawika.  An instance of a mitigating false memory question helps demonstrate: 
 
Example 4 (Mitigating- False Memory): James shoved Kawika.218 
This mitigating statement inaccurately reflected the story and thus, if 
allegedly recalled by participants, would constitute a false memory.  In the 
story, James shoved Kawika’s friend, not Kawika.219 If James had in fact 
shoved Kawika, it would tend to mitigate later aggressive actions taken by 
Kawika.  Significant results emerged for this statement when comparing 
responses of participants reading about Kawika to those reading about William 
and Tyronne.  A compelling 75% of participants who read about Kawika 
 
216 A chi-square indicated that this result was significant, p<.05 in comparing a 
combined measure of African American and Hawaiian condition participants with 
Caucasian condition participants. It was also marginally significant when comparing 
African Americans condition participants directly to Caucasian condition participants, p= 
.062. 
217 An ANOVA on the false memory mitigation index revealed significant effects, F 
(2, 149) = 3.05, p=.05. 
218 Fight DV #16. 
219 A false memory in this case would thus involve a source attribution error.    
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exhibited this false memory while those who read about Caucasians and 
African Americans exhibited 57% and 53% false memories, respectively.220 
It is too early to confidently interpret this result.  However, a possibility 
worth exploring relates to the complex and unique relationship between 
localism in the community221 (among Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian people 
alike) and positive and negative stereotypes.  Such a unique dynamic could 
simultaneously implicate negative stereotypes of aggression and more positive 
stereotypes regarding mitigation (understanding the historical and societal role 
and prevalence of the provocation of Hawaiians, for example).222 As a result, 
the false memory result above could be explained if the provocation of 
Hawaiians was a societal stereotype—since stereotypes are linked to false 
memory generation.  Future studies should investigate this unique source of 
false memory and the possibility of multidirectional stereotype activation in 
memory biases.     
 
3. Instances of Failed Recall in Employment Story 
 
Participants misremembered many more facts from the fight scenario than 
the employment scenario.223 Overall, participants exhibited a 71.2% recall 
accuracy rate for the fight scenario (with participants exhibiting a 34% false 
alarm rate) and a 94.0% recall accuracy rate for the employment scenario (with 
a 15.2% false alarm rate).  While the stories read by participants were not 
exceedingly simple, they were significantly simpler than the stories typically 
heard by jurors, and somewhat simpler than other memory studies on juries or 
mock-juries.224 The results indicate that the employment scenario was perhaps 
too easy for participants to recall.  Yet, it is unclear why The Confrontation,
also a simple story, generated significant errors while the employment story did 
not.  Despite the few significant results that were obtained in this study, the 
employment discrimination arena should not be discounted when discussing 
memory errors.  Future tests should examine the employment domain in more 
realistic (and also perhaps more stereotype-consistent) situations.  Researchers 
might also consider varying gender in addition to race, as gender has been 
shown to trigger stereotype consistent false memories in the employment 
 
220 A chi-square indicated that results were significant for Hawaiians compared to 
Caucasians, p<.05, and Hawaiians compared to African Americans, p<.05. 
221 Eric K. Yamamoto, The Significance of Local, in SOCIAL PROCESSES IN HAWAII 
(Peter Manicus, ed. 1974). 
222 The existence of positive and negative stereotypes about a race should not be 
surprising and has been documented.   
223 These results are not due to order effects.  To eliminate order effects, participants 
were presented the scenarios in both orders.  
224 Compare the case fact data presented in the memory study conducted by Pritchard 
& Keenan, supra note __.  In that study, participants viewed a thirty-five minute video of 
court testimony and were quizzed for recall.  The test in this study was substantially easier.   
46 Forgotten Equality 25-Aug-06 
context.225 
Within the employment story, though the indexes did not reveal significant 
effects, there was one interesting and significant false memory that emerged:   
 
Example 5 (Competence- False Memory): “Brenda was named Employee 
of the Month.”226 
This statement was inaccurate.  Participants who had false memories of this 
statement erroneously believed that Brenda achieved this honor.  In the story, it 
was Brenda’s father, not Brenda who earned this award.  Once again, errors of 
this type can be attributed to source misattribution.  The results indicated that 
participants who read about Brenda, compared to those who read about Keisha 
and Ka’olu, were more likely to falsely remember this fact.227 Participants who 
read about Brenda falsely remembered it 17% of the time while participants 
who read about Keisha and Ka’olu remembered it 10% and 2%, respectively. 
 
4. Implicit Memory Bias and Explicit Racism 
 
I next measured whether there was a relationship between explicit racial 
preferences (as measured by the SDO scale) and implicit memory recall.  For 
memory recall indexes (such as the aggression recall index for The 
Confrontation) and for most individual memory recall measures, there was no 
significant relationship between memory recall and explicit racial preferences.  
This finding indicates that participants who manifested more implicit memory 
bias were not more likely to be explicitly biased.  A few individual instances of 
memory recall in the African American and Hawaiian race conditions, 
however, did indicate a relationship (both correlative and predictive) in the 
opposite direction.  That is, in a few instances people with lower SDO scores 
(indicating less explicit racism) were surprisingly more likely to demonstrate 
more racially biased recall than people with higher SDO scores.   
 
I tested the correlation between the memory measures (both indexes and 
individual questions) and total SDO scores for participants in each race 
condition, and followed these correlations up with linear regression analyses.  
For the memory index responses and most memory questions, no significant 
results emerged.  For a few individual memory measures, however, significant 
correlations and predictive relationships emerged.  The following examples 
illustrate this unexpected effect. 
 
225 See Lenton, supra note __; Macrae, supra note __. 
226 Employment DV #2. 
227 A chi-square revealed that this effect was significant, measuring all three race 
conditions against each other, p<.05. 
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Significant correlations emerged in the African American race condition 
for SDO scores and the following memory measures: (1) After James fell to the 
ground, Tyronne kicked him; and (2) When Tyronne hit James in the face, he 
was really trying to push him rather than punch him.  The first memory 
measure above was negatively correlated to SDO score and the second was 
positively correlated to SDO score.228 These correlations indicated that 
participants who explicitly favored racial equality were (1) more likely to have 
false memories that Tyronne kicked James and (2) less likely to accurately 
recall that Tyronne was trying to push James rather than punch him.  Linear 
regression analyses were also significant for these measures, indicating that 
SDO scores served as predictors for these two memory measures in the same 
surprising direction.  These two examples provide counterintuitive results, 
indicating that people who explicitly favor more social equality sometimes 
were more likely to recall facts in biased ways than those who explicitly 
favored less social equality.229 
In the Hawaiian condition, a significant correlation emerged between 
memory recall and SDO score for the memory measure Ka’olu used her phone 
to make long distance calls. This memory measure was significantly correlated 
with overall SDO score in the negative direction.230 This correlation means 
that the more likely participants were to favor equality (generating a lower 
SDO score), the more likely they were to accurately remember this fact about 
Ka’olu.  A linear regression analysis was also significant for this memory 
measure, indicating that SDO score served as a negative predictor of this 
accurate memory recall response.231 
Taken together, the correlation and regression results indicate that explicit 
racial preferences and implicit recall bias usually were not significantly related.  
However, in the African American and Hawaiian conditions, there were 
individual instances where lower explicit bias actually predicted greater 
memory bias.  In the Caucasian condition, there was one instance where higher 
explicit bias predicted greater memory bias.232 
228 Two-tailed Pearson correlations were significant for both of these memory 
measures, p<.05. 
229 It should be noted that the relationship between SDO scores and implicit measures 
are relative.  That is, people who favor “less social equality” did not necessary disapprove 
of social equality and were not necessarily explicitly racist.  Instead, relative to other 
participants in the study, those who favored less equality were more likely to respond to 
certain questions in the manner reported. 
230 A two-tailed Pearson correlation was significant for this measure, p<.05. 
231 The linear regression analysis was significant, p<.05. A regression also indicated 
that a neutral memory question (“Ka’olu worked as a marketing clerk”) was also predicted 
by SDO by regression in the negative direction, t= -2.39, p<.05.   
232 In the Caucasian condition, a two-tiered Pearson correlation coefficient was 
significant (in the positive direction) between memory recall and SDO score for the 
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5. Limitations of the Study   
 
The results of the study complement existing discourse on implicit biases 
and memory errors and provide support for the theory that implicit racial bias 
affects case fact memories within the legal process.  Nonetheless, this study 
should only begin the empirical examination of implicit racial biases in case 
fact memories.  The methodology used in the study imperfectly and only 
loosely matched true legal processes.  For example, the study used stories that 
resembled some aspects of real life cases, but did not use real cases.  The study 
also tested university study participants, not real jurors (or judges).  Rather than 
participating in a trial, participants simply filled out a multi-part survey.  For 
these reasons and others,233 this empirical study alone should not be considered 
conclusive proof that the results generalize to the legal setting.234 However, 
taken in the context of existing research on implicit biases and memory errors, 
the study offers significant support for the claim and should generate real life 
concerns about racial justice in legal processes. 
 
V. IMPLICIT BIASES, CULTURAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DEBIASING  
measure William and his friend hit James one time each. This measure indicates opposite 
results than those in the African American and Hawaiian conditions.  The more likely 
participants were to explicitly favor racial and social hierarchy (generating a higher SDO 
score) the more likely they were to have false memories of this (mitigating) fact favoring 
William (recall from the story that William actually hit James twice).  A linear regression 
analysis was also significant for this memory measure, indicating that SDO score served as 
a predictor of this false memory response.  The linear regression analysis was significant, 
t=3.11, p<.05.  Thus, unlike the instances in the African American and Hawaiian 
conditions indicating lower explicit racial preferences sometimes served as a predictor of 
implicit memory bias, this instance indicated that higher explicit racial preference predicted 
implicit memory bias. 
233 Another example of the disconnect between the study and real legal processes is the 
ease and simplicity of the stories that were tested.  A real case would involve vastly greater 
amounts of information.  The judicial process thus requires a much more significant 
cognitive effort by jurors to encode and recall information.  Recall, however, that studies 
on cognitive depletion indicate that the greater the attention depletion, the greater the 
likelihood of stereotype consistent false memories.  This memory limitation raises the issue 
of whether memory biases in real cases might be worse than the empirical study illustrates. 
See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
234 Most studies fail in one way or another to replicate the legal setting.  One 
particularly impressive effort to replicate is that of  Samuel Sommers. Samuel R. Sommers, 
On Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making: Informational and Motivational Effects 
of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 
(2006).  Sommers gained access to Washtenaw county (Michigan) courts, where jurors 
were given an option to participate in his study or a real case.  See infra note __ and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this study and its implications. 
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The results of the empirical study, combined with existing research on 
implicit biases and memory, lead to the conclusion that implicit memory biases 
almost certainly operate in legal decision-making.  In light of previous legal 
discourse on cognitive errors, one might expect the discussion now to turn 
towards a science-driven “debiasing” proposal.  A debiasing methodology 
approaches implicit memory bias as an undesirable cognitive error that can 
perhaps be reversed through scientific experimentation.  Before proceeding 
with such an analysis, however, pause is necessitated by the fact that the cause 
of implicit memory bias is not a scientific error or quirk but instead is a 
manifestation of social and cultural factors that generate ingrained and 
automatic racial preferences.   
 
The challenge of addressing unconscious memory bias in legal decision-
making is twofold.  First, it requires gaining a deeper understanding of implicit 
racial bias by examining the relationship between cultural forces and cognitive 
processes.235 This examination shows that permanent elimination of implicit 
memory bias can only occur through a sustained process of cultural acceptance 
and change. Second, it requires embracing scientific methods to search for 
ways to temporarily moderate or eliminate the detrimental effects of implicit 
racism.236 Though science will not be able to solve the problem of implicit 
racial bias without cultural change, it has already helped identify the causal 
factors behind implicit biases as well as provided substantial clues about 
temporary reduction strategies.237 The need for continued scientific exploration 
is similarly heightened by a paradoxical legal context:  the legal system 
simultaneously embraces a mission of social justice while employing an 
implicitly biased decision-making process that hinders justice from being done.  
A multi-faceted response combining cultural change and scientific achievement 
is thus needed. 
 
A.  Cognitive Biases, Cultural Responsibility, and Social Justice 
 
Who or what is responsible for implicit racial biases?  Surprisingly few of 
the legal projects on implicit racial bias examine the causes of the biases or 
discuss the probable link between historical and cultural discrimination and 
 
235 The connection between culture and cognitive biases similarly has been overlooked 
in behavioral law and economics scholarship.  See Levinson & Peng, supra note __. 
236 Kang and Banaji, for example, demonstrated why cultural change and science are 
not mutually exclusive.  They suggested that using “debiasing agents” might over time help 
reduce stereotypes by changing the way people think about social categories.  See supra 
note __ and accompanying text.  This link between cultural change and science exemplifies 
the potential power of embracing the “fair measures” model Kang and Banaji suggest.   
237 Because cultural change will happen slowly (and may not happen at all without a 
sustained effort), the scientific endeavor will continue to be at the forefront of implicit bias 
discourse. 
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implicit racial biases.  Instead, many simply address the compelling evidence 
of implicit bias by employing a “debiasing” framework.  This style of problem 
reduction approach is a critical component of implicit bias discussions, but 
should not be both the beginning and end of discourse.  Furthermore, the 
difficulty that has been encountered in eliminating implicit racial biases should 
serve as a reminder that these automatic and unconscious biases are not random 
and meaningless “noise,” but powerful and meaningful connections between 
our life experiences, society and cognitive processes.  
 
Although legal scholars have frequently overlooked the social and cultural 
links to implicit biases, psychologists often discuss the causes of implicit biases 
and stereotypes.  According to Laurie Rudman, implicit biases are caused by a 
variety of factors, including culture.238 “System Justification Theory,” for 
example, posits that people sometimes act implicitly and automatically to 
maintain a structure of social order.239 This implicit need for social order, 
which often conflicts with a person’s explicit preferences, could be one direct 
link between a culture of racial subordination and implicit racial bias.  In a 
study investigating System Justification Theory, Rudman and her colleagues 
tested the link between cultural preferences and implicit (versus explicit) group 
favoritism.240 They found that members of less favored minority groups (such 
as overweight people and elderly people) implicitly preferred more favored 
minority groups (such as Asians and Jews) to their own groups, but that these 
preferences did not operate explicitly.241 The results indicated that the lower 
the cultural status of the group, the more likely that members of that group 
would demonstrate “automatic ingroup devaluation.”242 This research suggests 
that although people may act or speak out to (explicitly) reject social ordering 
of preferred groups, they are implicitly motivated to maintain social and 
cultural hierarchies.  In the legal setting, System Justification Theory explains 
how an implicit memory bias might act to similarly and unconsciously 
subordinate minorities.  As the empirical study in Section IV demonstrated, a 
diverse participant population implicitly disfavored African Americans even 
 
238 Rudman, supra note __ at 136 (identifying experiences, affect, cognitive balance, 
and the self as other potential causal links). 
239 See John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory:  Accumulated 
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 6 POL. PSYCHOL.
881 (2004).  System Justification Theory evidence shows, for example, that many members 
of minority groups harbor negative stereotypes about their own groups.  For a new 
discussion of system justification theory in law and social justice, see Gary Blasi & John T. 
Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:  Implications for Legal Advocacy and 
Social Justice (forthcoming CAL. L. REV. 2006). 
240 Laurie A. Rudman et al., Minority Members' Implicit Attitudes: Automatic Ingroup 
Bias As A Function Of Group Status, 20 SOC. COGNITION 294 (2002). 
241 Id.
242 Id. at __. 
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though they frequently explicitly favored equality.243 
The connection between implicit biases and culture is not surprising.  After 
all, it is quite intuitive that our biases reflect societal stereotypes.  Research on 
stereotype formation and maintenance confirms that stereotypes, a key 
ingredient in implicit memory bias, are instilled at an early age and come from 
cultural and societal beliefs.244 According to Antony Page, psychologists have 
found that stereotypes arise when a person is as young as three years old and 
are usually learned from parents, peers, and the media.245 As people grow 
older, their stereotypes become unconscious and remain mostly unchanged 
even as they develop non-prejudiced explicit views.246 Howard Ehrlich stated, 
“stereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of social heritage of 
society…[n]o person can grow up in a society without having learned the 
stereotypes assigned to the major ethnic groups.”247 This research illustrates 
the cultural grip that negative stereotypes have on our society and underscores 
the importance both of a process of cultural change and early interventional 
approaches to change harmful stereotypes.   
 
Recognizing the need to act against implicit bias on a societal as well as 
scientific level, Rudman presented several suggestions for change that are 
grounded both in theory and in practice.248 These suggestions include elements 
of education, policy advocacy, intergroup contact, and social inclusiveness.  
Legal scholars should take note that these solutions are neither entirely 
empirical nor are they primarily debiasing-focused.  Instead, they are diverse in 
methodologies and reflect a broader understanding of implicit biases as a 
societal problem.  Specifically, Rudman called for:  informing people about 
implicit biases, followed by “efforts to retain and expand policies that serve to 
override them, including affirmation action;”249 providing people the 
 
243 See supra Section IV. 
244 Recall that stereotype-consistency is a major theme in false memory generation.  
See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
245 Id. at 203, citing Frances E. Aboud & Maria Amato, Developmental and 
Socialization Influences on Intergroup Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: INTERGROUP PROCESSES 65, 73-76 (Rupert Brown & Samuel L. Gaertner 
eds., 2001). 
246 Id. at 204, (citing Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 
PSYCHOL. REV. 101, 103-04 (2000). 
247 Page, supra note __ at 203, quoting HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973). 
248 Rudman, supra note __ at 138. 
249 Id. at 138 (pointing out the overly optimistic nature of Affirmative Action’s 25 year 
“shelf life” under Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).  These suggestions are 
supported in part by Kang and Banaji’s “fair measures” proposal, which uses a variety of 
evidence on implicit bias to propose a multi-faceted framework for progress.  See Kang & 
Banaji, supra note __.   
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opportunity to be more emotionally comfortable with out group members250;
and recognizing the cultural influences on the self while striving for a more 
inclusive society.  These proposed solutions provide legally relevant pathways 
that can be implemented to eventually reduce the harmful effects of implicit 
memory bias.  In fact, scholars have already begun embracing each of these 
suggestions.  Kang and Banaji have argued that “fair measures” must be taken 
specifically to combat the societal harms of implicit biases.251 Scholars of 
intergroup contact have confirmed that sharing experiences with outgroup 
members truly works to reduce biases.252 And legal commentators beginning 
with Charles Lawrence have recognized the importance of recognizing 
culture’s influences on the self within a broader legal and societal context.253 
We must now coordinate these efforts for change. 
 
Ignoring cultural responsibility for implicit racial biases is not simply a 
failure to connect the root of the bias to the bias itself or a failure to develop an 
accurate model of legal decision-making.  Instead, ignoring the cultural 
foundations of implicit bias risks minimizing the responsibility of the legal 
system to deal with a society that continues to exhibit systematically racial 
preferences.  A debiasing framework, acting alone and without cultural context, 
thus risks ignoring the social justice mission of the law.254 When Charles 
Lawrence first wrote about unconscious racism, he was not simply telling us 
that people act in biased ways but they do not always realize it.  He was telling 
us that people are racist and that our culture is responsible.255 Thus, as we 
digest yet again the newest piece of evidence that implicit bias manifests in the 
legal system, we must understand that the deviation from rational decision-
making is not simply a cognitive glitch, but a meaningful cultural statement 
that reflects the way we unknowingly carry our society’s weaknesses with us at 
all times, even when encoding and recalling the simplest of facts.  Dealing with 
implicit racial biases, then, requires more than a scientific effort at debiasing 
through cues, primes, or deception.  It requires a recognition that their very 
existence represents a reflection of the past and current state of American 
 
250 See the discussion of intergroup contact theory, infra note __ and accompanying 
text. 
251 See Kang & Banaji, supra note __. 
252 See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda L. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup 
Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006). 
253 See Lawrence, supra note __. 
254 More detailed discussions of racial history, the American culture of discrimination, 
and its links to equal protection admittedly occur outside the mostly scientific scope of this 
paper.  Nonetheless, each of these components must be discussed in the context of 
unconscious racism.  See generally, Lawrence, supra note __.  See also Yamamoto, supra 
note __ (focusing on cultural responsibility in race relations).  “Debiasing,” by its nature is 
not always culturally ignorant.  Kang and Banaji’s model, for example, uses debiasing 
concepts in order to effectuate slow cultural change.  See Kang and Banaji, supra note __. 
255 Id. at __. 
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culture.  And this recognition, in turn, calls for steps that will facilitate cultural 
change. 
 
B.  Temporary Debiasing of Stereotypes and Memory Errors  
 
Although they do not always embrace the connection between cultural 
responsibility, social justice and implicit cognitions, debiasing efforts have 
significant practical potential for their ability to reduce or temporarily eliminate 
implicit memory biases.256 A debiasing approach to the problem of implicit 
memory bias can involve two interrelated tactics— reducing the power, 
frequency or pervasiveness of implicit racial biases and improving overall 
memory accuracy.  Both types of temporary measures give us clues as to how 
taking specific procedural actions within the legal system can reduce the 
harmful effects of implicit memory bias. 
 
1. Temporarily Reducing Implicit Biases.
A significant amount of recent research has focused on whether implicit 
stereotypes can be temporarily eliminated or moderated.257 These efforts have 
achieved mixed levels of success, and indicate that exposure to diversity or 
viewing minority exemplars, for example, can sometimes temporarily reduce 
people’s implicit biases.258 None of this research has directly tested how 
implicit memory bias might be reduced, nor has it been applied to jury 
decision-making.259 Nevertheless, studies indicate that confronting jurors with 
their implicit biases, striving for more diverse juries, and facilitating a more 
counter-stereotypic academy of lawyers and judges could help reduce the 
occurrence of implicit memory bias.  It must be noted, however, that before 
any concrete suggestions should be implemented, more research must be 
conducted to confirm their benefits in legal decision-making.   
 
More Counter-Stereotypic Attorneys and Judges. Some studies indicate 
that exposing jurors to minority exemplars such as attorneys and judges might 
help reduce implicit memory bias.  A study by Dasgupta and Greenwald found 
that exposure to admired minority exemplars can decrease implicit 
preferences.260 In that study, after taking a Black-White IAT, participants were 
exposed to pictures of “famous and admired” African Americans, such as Colin 
Powell, Will Smith, and Eddie Murphy, and “infamous and disliked” 
 
256 There are also theoretical implications.  Debiasing studies may offer clues as to 
why the pervasive effects of implicit biases continue to prosper in our automatic and 
unconscious cognitive processes. 
257 Some of these studies have been reviewed in other contexts.  See, e.g., Kang, supra 
note __, Page, supra note __; Kang & Banaji, supra note __. 
258 Page, supra note __ at 237, citing Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note __. 
259 But see Sommers, infra note __ and accompanying text. 
260 Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note __.    
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Caucasian Americans, such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Howard Stern, and John 
Gotti.261 After exposure to these pictures (which were presented under the 
guise of being a test of famous person recognition), participants immediately 
retook an IAT, and took yet another IAT after twenty-four hours.  Results 
indicated that the exposure to the African American exemplars and disliked 
Caucasians reduced (but did not eliminate) automatic pro-White implicit bias, 
and that bias reduction continued for at least twenty-four hours.262 
A more recent study by Nilanjana Dasgupta and Shaki Asgari harnessed 
this knowledge to test how exemplary leaders can affect women’s automatic 
biases about their own in-group.263 The study indicated that exposure to 
women in leadership positions can lead to a reduction of in-group implicit 
biases among women.264 One important contribution of Dasgupta and Asgari’s 
study was that it examined the role of exemplars in naturally occurring 
leadership roles (such as college students’ exposure to female professors).  
Their results indicate that women who “inhabit local environments in which 
women frequently occupy counter-stereotypic leadership roles” can undermine 
automatic stereotypes.265 Results such as these, which illustrate the debiasing 
potential of exemplars, prompted Kang and Banaji to argue for “fair measures” 
in hiring more counter-stereotypical employees.266 Implementing a fair 
measures paradigm in the legal profession (which would include a systematic 
effort to increase counter-stereotypic law students, lawyers and judges) could 
 
261 Id. at 811. 
262 Id. at __.  These results were reported in contrast to participants in a control 
condition (who saw no images) and in a pro-White exemplar condition.  The researchers 
also found similar effects in reducing implicit bias related to elderly.  Interestingly, though 
a reduction in implicit attitudes was found, explicit racial preferences were not significantly 
altered. 
263 Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing is Believing: Exposure To 
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders And Its Effect On The Malleability of Automatic 
Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642 (2004). 
264 Id. at 654. Other studies have investigated gender stereotype reduction using mental 
imagery. Unlike real-life exposure to counter-stereotypic (human) exemplars as 
investigated by Dasgupta and Asgari, Irene Blair and her colleagues tested how simply 
imagining and then describing a “strong woman” (for example) might reduce implicit bias 
as measured on the IAT.  Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away:  The 
Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 828 (2001). Their results were significant, indicating that mentally accessing a 
counter-stereotype can help reduce implicit bias.  Recent research also indicates that 
appealing to a person’s egalitarian beliefs can help moderate discriminatory behavior. 
Nalanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to Behavior: 
The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs About Gender and Behavioral Control, 91 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 268 (2006)(testing the relationship between egalitarian 
beliefs and anti-gay behaviors). 
265 Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note __. 
266 Kang & Banaji, supra note __ at __. 
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similarly and eventually generate debiasing benefits in jury decision-making.267 
Confronting Jurors with Biases. New research indicates that explicitly 
confronting people with their biases may be an effective tool in decreasing 
stereotyped responses.  A study by Alexander Czopp and his colleagues found 
that even though confrontations can create hostility towards a confronter, they 
can (at least temporarily) also reduce stereotypes.268 In the study, participants 
were asked to participate in an on-line chat.269 During this chat, participants 
were asked to give their impressions about pictures and statements.  These 
pictures and statements were designed deliberately so that they would invoke at 
least some racial stereotypes, thus assuring that participant responses would be 
racially stereotype-consistent enough to allow for confrontation.270 After the 
participants gave such stereotype-consistent responses, a collaborator (who was 
posing as another participant in the on-line chat) confronted them about their 
potentially racist responses.271 Post-confrontation, participants were given a 
confidential stereotype test (in which participants were alone-- no collaborator 
was present to confront them). The researchers found that post-confrontation 
participant responses displayed significantly fewer stereotypes (compared to 
before being confronted).  One potential practical implication of this line of 
research involves using racial stereotype measures on pre-trial jury 
questionnaires, and non-threateningly confronting jurors with their biases 
during voir dire or jury instructions.272 
More Diverse Juries. Culture and diversity have been linked to the 
reduction of implicit biases.  These studies indicate that racially diverse juries, 
for example, may make fewer cognitive errors than homogeneous jurors, and 
that learning about or experiencing diversity and multicultural ideologies in 
general can reduce implicit bias.  In a study of legal decision-making 
 
267 It is hard to predict, however, how positive effects of an African-American attorney 
or judge, for example, would interact with the negative effects of a stereotype-consistent 
African American criminal defendant. 
268 Alexander M. Czopp et al., Standing Up for a Change: Reducing Bias Through 
Interpersonal Confrontation, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784 (2006). 
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at __.  For example, one resembled the following:  “but maybe it would be good 
to think about Blacks in other ways that are a little more fair? it just seems that a lot of 
times Blacks don't get equal treatment in our society. you know what i mean?”  The 
confrontations were successful using low level threats (such as the one quoted) and high 
level threats (which involved mentioning that the participant’s responses sounded racist). 
272 Debiasing judges through confrontations would require other measures.  It is 
important to note that there are no indicators yet that such a juror confrontation would 
reduce implicit bias in the legal setting.  Before implementing any juror confrontation 
scheme, the specific design should be tested empirically. 
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processes, Samuel Sommers recorded and evaluated mock jury deliberations.273 
Some mock-juries included only Caucasians and others included both 
Caucasians and African-Americans.274 Sommers found that racially 
heterogeneous mock juries cited more facts from the case, made fewer errors 
when discussing facts (and when they did make errors, were more likely to 
correct them275), and were more open to discussing racism than homogonous 
Caucasian juries.276 Although Sommers did not test implicit bias reduction, the 
results hold promise that diverse juries might better overcome implicit memory 
biases than homogenous juries.  In practice, however, calling for more diverse 
juries is controversial.  Courts are hesitant to apply diversity rationales to petit 
juries, and will generally look only at juror representation across a larger 
community.277 However, if other measures are less effective in overcoming 
implicit memory bias, then striving for (or even requiring) heterogeneous juries 
might be warranted, particularly when legal participants come from stereotyped 
groups.  
 
Juror Diversity Training. Implementing diversity or multiculturalism 
training for jurors might similarly help reduce implicating memory biases.  A 
study by Jennifer Richeson and Richard Nussbaum found that exposing 
participants to a multicultural viewpoint, compared to a “color-blind” 
viewpoint, resulted in lesser implicit bias on the Black-White IAT.278 In that 
study, participants learned about either the virtues of multiculturalism 
(celebrating differences across groups) or color-blindness (ignoring differences 
across groups).279 This simple introduction to the two ideologies was enough 
to affect IAT outcome.280 Those who learned about multiculturalism reduced 
their implicit biases and displayed significantly less implicit bias than those 
who learned about color-blindness.281 
273 Samuel R. Sommers, supra note __. 
274 Id.
275 Recall that in Prichard and Keenan’s study, jury deliberation barely helped correct 
individual memory errors.  While Sommers did not employ a methodology designed to test 
the statistical significance of memory error correction generally, his study raises the 
possibility that diverse juries (which were not reported and presumably not tested by 
Pritchard and Keenan) might have a unique ability to correct more memory errors than 
homogeneous juries.  Such a theory should be tested empirically.  See Prichard & Keenan, 
supra note __; Sommers, supra note __.  
276 Id. at 22-30. 
277 Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 668 
(2002) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). 
278 Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard A. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism 
Versus Color-Blindness on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417 (2004). 
279 Id. at __.  The learning process included reading about multiculturalism or color-
blindness as well as writing about it. 
280 Id. at 420. 
281 Id.
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A study by Rudman and her colleagues tested the effects of a diversity 
education program and found similar results to Richeson and Nussbaum, 
indicating that learning the values of diversity can at least temporarily reduce 
implicit stereotypes.282 In that study, participants voluntarily attended a 
diversity and conflict seminar, during which they learned about inter-group 
conflict, engaged in discussions, and kept a journal.283 Participants were given 
IAT tests both prior to and after the semester.  Results indicated that students in 
the diversity and conflict seminar reduced both their implicit (as measured by 
the IAT) and explicit racial biases, while those in the control group (who 
received no diversity training) did not.284 These studies indicate that diversity 
or multiculturalism training could potentially help juries reduce implicit racial 
biases.  Yet implementing a mandatory diversity course, for example, could 
risk backfiring if jurors became angry about being required to participate (an 
emotion that could be common considering that people are often unaware of 
their implicit biases).  Thus, before implementing training, further research 
should be conducted to test what types of training programs would be tolerated 
by jurors without backlash.285 One possibility is that diversity training would 
perhaps generate less resistance by jurors if it were a component of a larger 
juror education or training program. 
 
282 Laurie A. Rudman et al., Unlearning Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit 
Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856 (2001). The 
researchers did point to evidence, however, that forced compliance with “pro-Black” 
requests can result in anger and backlash.  Id. at 857, (citing E. A. Plant & Patricia G. 
Devine, Responses to Other Imposed Pro-Black Pressure:  Acceptance or Backlash? 37 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 486 (2001)). 
283 Id. at 858. Other participants, who were in the control group, were enrolled in a 
research methods course.  It is interesting to note that (in the first experiment conducted) 
participants in the training group were taught by an African American professor while 
participants in the control group were taught by a Caucasian professor.  Thus, effects 
generated between the two groups might have emerged from effects similar to those 
demonstrated by Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note __.  The experimenters corrected this 
potential confound in experiment 2 by having the same African-American professor teach 
the control group’s course.  Results in experiment 2 indicated the same bias-reduction 
results as in experiment 1—for the experimental group but not for the control group.  Id. at 
863-864. 
284 Id. at 860-861. 
285 Jury training has been suggested in other contexts.  See, e.g. James J. Gobert, In 
Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 326 (1988) (suggesting 
implement juror “impartiality training”); Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The 
Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and Legal 
Decisionmaking, 66 B.U.L. REV. 771 (1986); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' 
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal 
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 133 (2002) (discussing training effectiveness generally and 
applying it to judges).  
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One theory behind diversity training and multiculturalism, that increasing 
an understanding of out-group members will lead to reduction in prejudice (in 
the language of intergroup contact theory-- “familiarity breeds liking”286), is 
supported by a large volume of work.287 This work reaffirms that exposure to 
people across groups acts to reduce biases, particularly under optimal 
conditions.  A meta-analysis by Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp 
demonstrated that across hundreds of studies, intergroup contact does in fact 
lead to prejudice reduction.288 The researchers found that intergroup contact 
that comported with Allport’s 1954 formulation of “optimal contact” displayed 
the most prejudice reduction.  These optimal contact conditions include: equal 
status; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authority, 
such as the law.289 Interestingly, Allport’s optimal conditions appear to 
describe the mandate, function, and process of juries.  Thus, the possibility is 
raised not only that diverse juries may display less prejudice (as investigated by 
Sommers290), but also that the experience of being on a diverse jury itself could 
lead to less future prejudice.291 
2. Improving Memory Accuracy and Reducing False Memories. 
Two different styles of memory improvement efforts might help mitigate 
the effects of implicit memory bias.  First, research on reducing memory errors 
offers clues about how jury instructions or other debiasing measures might help 
mitigate memory inaccuracies.  These projects often suggest that implementing 
“late stage correction” strategies can reduce some memory errors, although the 
reduction of stereotype related memory errors has proved particularly 
challenging.  Second, practical solutions such as juror note-taking and 
question-asking can help improve memory retention in the legal process.  
Though these strategies have not been investigated with regard to racial 
memory biases, they offer hope that general memory improvement will help 
reduce racially biased errors. 
 
In light of the compelling evidence linking false memory generation to 
stereotypes, researchers have begun exploring ways to try to moderate the 
potentially harmful effects of stereotype-consistent false memories.  These 
efforts have yielded mixed success and serve as a reminder that trying to 
 
286 Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note __ at 766.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 752, citing GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). The meta-
analysis indicated that these conditions are best viewed as a “bundle” (meaning that they 
are most effective if all conditions are met).  The researchers do note, however, that the 
institutional support criterion might be especially important.  Id. at 766. 
290 Sommers, supra note __. 
291 See Id. at 768 (noting that although there are some indicators that future prejudice is 
reduced by intergroup contact, more longitudinal studies are needed).  
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reduce the harmful effects of stereotypes is a difficult process.  Keith Payne 
and his colleagues examined whether instructing participants to respond to 
memory tasks based on their confidence levels might help reduce stereotype-
consistent false memories. 292 If stereotype-consistent false memories emerge 
only when people make guesses, they hypothesized, then instructing people to 
only answer when they are subjectively confident in their memory should 
eliminate stereotype-consistent false memories.293 The results of the study 
indicated that giving such instructions helped improve general memory 
accuracy, but did not reduce the amount of stereotype consistent false 
memories.  In fact, participants were just as likely to display stereotype-
consistent false memories when they expressed 100% certainty in their 
memory judgments as when they expressed zero certainty.294 Encouraging 
jurors to rely on their memory confidence levels, then, appears to be a less than 
promising way of reducing memory errors.  The study also raises the concern 
that taking steps to improve general memory accuracy, as I propose elsewhere, 
will not necessarily lead to reduction in stereotype-consistent memory errors. 
 
Late-Correction Memory Strategies. A study by Marsh and his colleagues 
provides a little more optimism for generating a legal process response to 
implicit memory bias.  Such a response might involve de-stereotyping tasks in 
connection with jury instructions to reduce stereotype-consistent false 
memories.  Marsh and his colleagues found that using conscious memory 
control processes may reduce people’s reliance on stereotypes in making 
source attributions.  Participants viewed a series of gender-stereotype 
consistent statements (such as “I made a centerpiece for the dining table”) 
along with the gender neutral name of the person who made the statement.295 
After a distraction task, the gender and sexual orientation of the people who 
made the statements was revealed.  Participants were then asked to recall who 
made the statements.  Results indicated that source attribution errors were 
consistently influenced by gender and sexual orientation stereotype.  For 
example, participants over-attributed stereotypically male statements to 
heterosexual males and homosexual females.   
 
The experimenters next tested whether “late correction” memory strategies 
might reduce or eliminate the source attribution bias.  Before responding to the 
 
292 B. Keith Payne et al., Memory Monitoring and the Control of Stereotype Distortion,
40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 52 (2004). 
293 Id. at 54. In part I of experiment, participants performed a memory test in which 
participants studied a list of “Black” and “White” names (those typically associated with 
Black or White individuals), which were randomly grouped together with one of two 
occupations (basketball player or politician).  As in other studies described, results for this 
test indicated the expected stereotype-consistent false memories. 
294 Id. at 58. 
295 Id. at 151.  This was the methodology for the first portion of the study. 
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recall task, participants were told to list reasons why they believed stereotypes 
were harmful in today’s society.296 Implementing this simple task reduced 
some but not all source attribution errors.  For example, participants became 
more accurate in attributing masculine stereotyped statements to homosexual 
males.297 The moderate success in correcting stereotype-consistent source 
attribution errors indicates that late correction memory strategies hold promise 
for reducing legal errors based on stereotypes.  In keeping with “late stage” 
delivery, these correction strategies could be implemented simultaneously with 
jury instructions.298 However, practical problems might arise in the jury 
context with a de-stereotyping task that requires jurors to make a list about the 
harms of stereotypes in order to effectively debias.  Yet it is too early to rule 
out any solutions, even potentially impractical ones. 
 
Juror Note-taking and Question Asking. Another type of memory debiasing 
takes advantage of procedural tasks such as note-taking to combat memory 
errors.  One of the more popular arguments in support of juror note-taking is 
the common-sense expectation that note-taking allows jurors to refresh their 
memories.299 Benefits of note-taking have been verified empirically.  In one 
such study, Horwitz and ForsterLee found that mock jurors who were allowed 
to take notes during a mock trial did a better job of assessing relevant factual 
information, including distinguishing between the deservingness of recovery of 
various plaintiffs.300 This increased accuracy level exceeded much smaller 
improvements shown by mock-jurors who did not take notes but had transcript 
access.301 
Because decisions regarding note-taking are made by the trial judge,302 
keeping track of statistics on the prevalence of juror note-taking is difficult.  If 
the vast majority of courts already allow or even encourage note-taking, then 
suggesting note-taking reforms becomes superfluous.  Studies, however, reveal 
 
296 In keeping with the late stage correction theory, participants made this list between 
viewing the statements and recalling who made the statements.  Id.
297 Id. at 157. However, the instruction did not significantly reduce source attributions 
relying upon the “masculine” stereotype of homosexual females and only slightly reduced 
the number of total attribution errors made. 
298 Other commentators concerned with juror information processing inefficiencies 
have argued for debiasing instructions.  Prescott & Starr, supra note __  at 342 (stating that 
such debiasing instructions can “hardly hurt”).  The efforts I propose could be combined 
with such efforts. 
299 Douglas Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1997) 
300 Irwin A. Horowitz & Lynne ForsterLee, The Effects of Note-Taking and Trial 
Transcript Access on Mock Jury Decisions in a Complex Civil Trial, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
373 (2001). 
301 Id. at 387. 
302 Smith, supra note __ at 568.
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mixed results.  A 1988 survey by Heuer and Penrod indicated that 
approximately one-third of trial judges allow note-taking at trial.303 More 
recent projects have pointed to a trend in allowing note-taking, even calling the 
practice “widespread.”304 Whatever the true estimate, judge-encouraged juror 
note-taking appears to be needed still.  
 
In addition to their calls for juror note-taking reform, scholars concerned 
about juror memory errors and cognitive load outside of the implicit bias 
context have called for additional reforms such as question asking (where 
jurors may submit questions to the judge during trial) and transcript access.305 
These scholars have pointed out that “active juror” reforms improve juror 
information processing and self-monitoring.306 Encouraging wider-scale note-
taking, question asking and transcript access might reduce implicit memory 
bias by bolstering overall memory accuracy.  However, to date there is no 
evidence that these steps reduce particular memory errors, generation of false 
memories, or stereotype-consistent memory bias.  Further research should be 
conducted to determine whether these procedural steps, perhaps in combination 
with late stage memory control techniques (as implemented by Marsh and his 
colleagues) can help reduce implicit memory biases.  Researchers must also 
continue to investigate strategies to reduce or temporarily eliminate stereotype-
consistent memory errors.  Studies in this area have not been as successful as 
hoped, leading some researchers to conclude that the best way to change 
stereotype-consistent false memories is to change the stereotypes 
themselves.307 
3.  Future Directions.
The ways in which implicit biases can be moderated and memory errors 
reduced provide hope for bias reduction and demonstrate the continued 
importance of future research.  The research I have described indicates that 
although much progress has been made, greater efforts are needed.  Implicit 
 
303 Id. at 569 (citing Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Participation in 
Trials: A Field Experienced in Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 231 (1988). 
304 MARDER, supra note __ at 108, citing JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 141 (G. Thomas 
Munsterman et al., eds. 1997). Some of this trend may be due to strong support for juror 
note-taking by well respected organizations such as the American Bar Association and 
Brookings Institution.  See NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 109 (2005), citing 
ABA/BROOKINGS SYMPOSIUM, CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 18 
(1992)(calling juror note-taking the “most widely suggested reform for enhancing juror 
comprehension”). 
305 See Prescott & Starr, supra note __ (citing Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, 
Increasing Juror Participating in Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 
JUDICATURE 256 (1995)). 
306 Id. at 342-343. 
307 See Sherman et al., supra note __. 
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racial biases are elicited quickly and easily, and can only be temporarily 
reduced through interventional approaches.  Biased memory errors, too, have 
resisted correction.  While general memory has been shown to improve with 
procedural measures, researchers are only beginning to understand how 
stereotype-consistent memory errors might be reduced.  The effort in both of 
these areas must continue so that a comprehensive legal model of implicit 
memory bias-reducing interventions can be developed.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
How can the American legal system stand for justice and fairness when it 
embraces a decision-making process that propagates racial bias?  The 
automatic and pervasive nature of implicit memory biases highlights the 
difficulty of finding a solution for this moral and practical conundrum.  As I 
have argued, the only surefire solution for implicit memory bias is cultural 
change.  When racial stereotypes no longer disproportionately link minorities 
to negative traits, implicit memory biases will disappear.  In the meantime, 
however, some important temporary measures may help lessen the harmful 
racial effects of implicit memory biases.  Nonetheless, more research is needed. 
This research will continue to inform us as to the nature of memory biases 
themselves and to ameliorating efforts that will aid the battle against biases in 
legal decision-making.  Research should also be conducted across legal 
disciplines to determine the pervasiveness of implicit memory biases.  These 
projects might include examinations of decision-making processes in areas 
such as employment discrimination, property ownership, death penalty, 
intellectual property, and more. 
 
Although the legal decision-making implications are challenging enough, 
implicit memory biases have implications beyond the legal system.  If they are 
as pervasive as the research tends to indicate, they may effect decisions big and 
small—from committees deciding which applicant to admit or job seeker to 
hire (perhaps misremembering qualifications) to a donor deciding how much 
money to donate to a charity (perhaps misremembering reputation or past 
performance).  Future research should thus be conducted not only within the 
legal setting.  Only through these projects can we begin to fashion a 
sophisticated legal response to the harms caused.  In the meantime, however, so 
long as implicit biases go unchecked in legal decision-making, we cannot be 
confident that social justice is at hand. 
Appendix A- Dependent Variable Measures 
 
Below is a list of facts.  Some of the facts below accurately describe the case you read.  
Other facts below do not accurately describe the case you read. Please circle “Y” (for 
“yes”) next to the facts that are accurately reported from the case.  If a fact does not 
accurately describe the information you read, or if the fact was not in the case at all, 
circle “N” (for “no”).     
 
1) James smiled at William after spilling beer on him.   Y/N 
2) William and his friend hit James one time each.   Y/N 
3) William and James first encountered each other in a bar.   Y/N 
4) William wore a tee shirt and jeans.      Y/N 
5) After James said “Let it go,” William replied by saying “What if we won’t let it 
go?”         Y/N 
6) William hit James in the face immediately after James shoved William’s friend.     
 Y/N 
7) After being punched, James took out an object from his pocket. Y/N 
8) Before going to the bar, William and his friend ate at a local diner. Y/N 
9) James worked as a plumber.       Y/N 
10) William punched James from behind.     Y/N 
11) William and his friend followed James as he left the bar.  Y/N 
12) After James fell to the ground, William kicked him.   Y/N 
13) When William hit James in the face, he was really trying to push him rather than 
punch him.          Y/N 
14) When they saw him outside a diner, William and his friend approached James.  
Y/N 
15) William was angry that James had spilled beer on him in the bar. Y/N 
16) James shoved William.       Y/N 
 
Appendix A (continued) 
 
Below is a list of facts.  Some of the facts below accurately describe the case you read.  
Other facts below do not accurately describe the case you read. Please circle “Y” (for 
“yes”) next to the facts that are accurately reported from the case.  If a fact does not 
accurately describe the information you read, or if the fact was not in the case at all, 
circle “N” (for “no”).     
 
1) Brenda worked as a marketing clerk.   Y/N 
2) Brenda was named employee of the month.  Y/N 
3) Brenda’s employment contract stated that she should not be terminated without good 
cause.                Y/N 
4) Brenda had permission to use her computer for personal use, so long as it occurred 
during her fifteen minute breaks.    Y/N 
5) Brenda frequently surfed the web.    Y/N 
6) Brenda always completed her assigned work.  Y/N 
7) Brenda’s internet blog generated publicity and created new business.   Y/N 
8) Brenda worked for “Big Burger Company.”    Y/N 
9) Brenda’s employment contract stated that she could be terminated if she failed to 
comply with the employee handbook.    Y/N 
10) Brenda liked hamburgers but not french fries.    Y/N 
11) Brenda used her phone to make personal long-distance calls.    Y/N 
12) Brenda was allowed a one hour lunch break.  Y/N 
13) Brenda was occasionally sloppy in her work.   Y/N 
14) Brenda worked longer hours than was required.  Y/N 
15) Brenda posted a blog complaining about the company’s burgers.   Y/N 
16) Brenda received mixed reviews from superiors.  Y/N 
 
Appendix B- Individual Recall Results: 
Aggression Example 1: “When they saw him outside a diner, William and his friend 
approached James.” 
 
Accurate Fact?  African American/ Hawaiian  Caucasian 
No 7 10 
Yes 91 44 
Aggression Example 2: “Tyronne punched James from behind.” 
Accurate Fact?    African American  Caucasian  Hawaiian 
No 21 31 31 
Yes 30 23 17 
Aggression Example 3 (False Memory): “After James said ‘Let it go,’ Tyronne replied by 
saying ‘What if we won’t let it go?’” 
Accurate Fact? African American/ Hawaiian  Caucasian 
No 29 24 
Yes 69 30 
Mitigation Example 4 (False Memory): “James shoved Kawika.” 
 
Accurate Fact? Hawaiian  Caucasian African American 
No   12 23 24 
Yes 36 31 27 
Employment Example 5 (False Memory): “Brenda was named Employee of the Month.” 
 
Accurate Fact? Hawaiian  Caucasian African American 
No   47 45 45 
Yes 1 9 5 
